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If [one] freeman lies with the wife of [another] freeman, let him 
pay recompense [with] her wergeld [man-price] and obtain 
another wife ffor the husband} [with} his own money and bring 
her to the other man at home. 
Laws of Aethelberht (597x614) No. 31 
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student 
of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive 
time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the 
custom, belief or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The 
reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and 
ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be 
accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of which seems 
to explain it and reconcile it with the present state of things; and 
then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been 
found for it, and enters on a new career. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881) 
The history of man indicates that as soon as he created the 
relationship of marriage, "adultery was not far behind. " 
Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery-A Synopsis, 
1 J. Fam. L. 89, 89 (1961) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. An Immodest Hypothetical 
987 
You have been married for ten years, and you have two children. You 
would describe life in your marriage neither as being tethered to a rock and 
having your liver consumed on a daily basis nor as Elysian bliss every 
moment of every day. On average, your married life has been something in 
between, and it sometimes drifts near one extreme or the other. You 
sometimes find your spouse relatively boring and other people more 
exciting. 1 Nonetheless, you have remained sexually faithful to your spouse 
since exchanging wedding vows, which you vaguely remember included 
1. Being both a sensitive and perceptive person, you realize that other people may seem 
more exciting in comparison with your spouse, because you do not have to interact with them 
on paying bills, changing diapers, buying groceries, and many of the other sometimes mundane 
duties that accompany marriage. 
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something about loving and honoring your spouse, and even forsaking all 
others and keeping only unto your spouse. 2 
One day, after you take the kids to school, you pay a surprise visit to 
your spouse at work. You walk into your spouse's office to find your 
spouse and a co-employee on the floor engaged in sexual intercourse. What 
do you want to do? 
A. Kill your spouse. 
B. Kill your spouse's partner. 
C. Kill your spouse and your spouse's partner. 
D. Sue your spouse's partner. 
E. Divorce your spouse. 
F. All of the above, except E. 3 
In most states in this nation, you will not be implementing choice D 
because the law does not permit such lawsuits. Furthermore, the law will 
not permit you to perform the executions in choices A through. C and F 
without visiting some consequences upon you. 4 Thus, under. the current law 
in most jurisdictions, you probably will be limited to choice E. 
B. The Strange Case of the Disappearing Torts 
Why do the laws of most states not permit you to sue your spouse's 
partner? If you are willing to forego killing her or him (which past 
civilizations assumed you would do) why can you not sue the marital 
interloper? If instead of engaging in sex with your spouse, the other person 
had walked up to you and taken a swing at you and hit you, you would have 
had a tort action for battery (and probably assault). If the person 11ad taken 
a swing at you and missed, you probably would have had a tort action for 
assault. The person has sex with your spouse, and you have no tort action 
against that person. 5 What does it say about contemporary American tort 
2. Traditional Wedding Vow. 
3. Choice E is excluded if you exercise all other options. If you kill your spouse, the 
marriage ends, and it is not necessary (and probably would be unseemly in any event) to divorce 
her or him. If you kill your spouse's partner, however, choice D still would be possible. You 
might still assert a claim against the deceased partner's estate, although this option, too, seems 
unseemly. 
4. It has not always been so. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
5. My point here is to focus on the interest of the plaintiff that is invaded and the 
magnitude of the banns suffered by the plaintiff in each of these situations. I real\ze that there 
are significant differences, other than the magnitude of the hann suffered, betwee,n �attery and 
assault, on the one hand, and alienation of affections and criminal conversation on the other. 
One may insist, for example, that the sexual autonomy of a third party, the participating spouse, 
is an interest at stake in alienation of affections and criminal conversation, but third-party 
autonomy is not at issue in the hypothetical battery and assault. Consideration of that point will 
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law6 and society that you cannot sue one wbo interferes in, and perhaps 
destroys, your marriage by engaging in sexual relations with your spouse? 
Alienation of affections and criminal conversation have been 
disappearing from American tore law for sixty-five years. Very few states 
still recognize either tort theory or both. 7 As once recognized by almost all 
states, criminal conversation was a simple tort. It was tbe tort theory a 
plaintiff could pursue against a third party who had sexual relations with the 
plaintiffs spouse.8 There was no defense other than the nonparticipating 
lake us quickly into a vilification of the plaintiff's in1eres1 in exclusive sexual relations wilh ber 
or his spouse as an archaic and discrediled properfy in1erest. I appreciale !hat argument, and I 
will address lhal issue presently. See infra noies 138-156 and accompanying 1ext. For now, 
focus on the magnjlllde of lhe hann IO the plaintiff. Even crilics of alienation of affections and 
criminal conversation recognize lhnl the nonparticipating spouse suffers an emotionally painful, 
and per11aps debilitating, inJWJI. See. e.g .. Manha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: 
Rejlec1io11s on Sex Scandals and rhe Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305, 339-41 ( 1998) 
(nclmowledg ing lhal adullery "may give rise 10 serious rcla1i onal harms, wbe1her or not 
accompanied by deceil," and describi ng 1he wound 10 "manly pride" in some cases as "a kind of 
emasculation"). For discuss ion of the emolional harm caused by adullery, see generally JANIS 
ABRAHMS SPRING, AJ.iER THE AFFAIR: HEALING THE PAIN AND REBUILDING 1)\UST WllEN A 
PARTI'1ER HAS Bm.i UNFAITHFUql996). 
6. The.o;e issues are at tl1e interM:ction of tort law and family law. See Linda L. Berger, 
Lies Between Mommy and Daddy: 11re Case for Recognizing Spousal Emotional Dlstrtss 
Claims Based on Damesrlc Decelr Thar Interferes with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 449, 45 l (2000) (discussing lhe conflict inherent in domestic tortS being at the 
in1erscction of family Jaw and tort Jaw). The view tha1 one takes of lhese interferences wilh 
family relationships, whether primarily from the perspective of tort law or prirnarily from lhe 
perspective of family Jaw, can make a difference in whelher one favors recognition or abolition 
of a tort cause of aclion. Consider, for example, the position of Professor Jane Murphy who, in 
discussing lhe morality of family Jaw, identities lhe goal of protecting children as the central 
moral goal of family Jaw. Jane. C. Murphy, Rules. Responsibility and Commlrmem ro Children: 
71re New Language of Morality In Pamlly Law, 60 U. PflT. L. REV. 1111, 1116-17 (1999). 
Viewing adultery from the perspective of tort law, I would not identify protection of chi ldren as 
the central goal. I think, however, it is an important goal, and I do contend !hat it is a goal that 
may be promoted by rccognjzin.g a right IO a remedy against a marital interloper. 
7. DAN B. Doses, 2 Tue LA w OF ToRTS 1247 (200 I) [hereinafter Doses]. See generally 
W. PAGE KEETON ETAL, PROSStR ANO KEETON ON THE I.AW OF TORTS,§ 124 (Sib ed. 1984 & 
Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER]. In a recent case, lhe Soulh Dakota Supreme Court, refusing 
to abolish the tort of alienation of affections, S\ll'Veyed lhe current state of the law: thirty-four 
states had abolished lhe tori by legislation; five had abolished it judicially; Louisiana had never 
recognized it (IO be qualified later); and Alaska bad no stalllte or case law on the issue. Veeder 
v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610, 614 nn.3-4 (S.D. 1999) (citing cases from each jurisdiction). Thai 
leaves only nine states that definitely recognize alienation of affections: Hawaii, lllinois, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Norlb Carolina, South Dakota, a.nd Utah. 
Id. at 614 n.6. Criminal conversation may be recognized in fewer jurisdictions. For example, 
the Mississippi and Utah Supreme Courts preserved alienation of affections but abolished 
criminal conversation. Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Miss. 1992); Norton v. 
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 15-17 (Utah 1991). 
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 685 (1977) [hereinafter llEsTATEMENT]; Doees, 
supra note 7, at 1246; see also 2 FOWLER v. H�RPER ET AL, TuE I.Aw OF TORTS, at 506 n.6 
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spouse's consent. 9 The third party's knowledge of the marital relationship 
was not part of the plaintiff's prima facie case, and lack of such knowledge 
did not provide an affinnative defense. 10 
Alienation of affections was not as simple. The name suggests that the 
recovery is for the defendant's destroying the affection of one spouse for 
the other. ln reality, however, the recovery was for loss of consonium, 
meaning rights to monopolistic sexual relations, society, and 
companionship.11 The plaintiff had to establish the existence of the 
marriage with some accompanying affection, that the love and affection 
were destroyed, and that the acts of the defendant caused the destruction. 12 
Plaintiffs could recover without proof of adultery, without provin� that the 
spouse bad left the home, and without proving pecuniary loss. 3 Some 
authorities say that an absence of affection between the spouses defeats the 
action, but most courts presume some affection, holding that even a bad 
marriage has some hope of reconciliation." Bad relations and lack of 
affection between the spouses were often treated as mitigating damages. u 
The defendant must have engaged in some affinnative conduct intended to 
diven the attentions of plainti.frs spouse, although that conduct need not 
(2nd ed. 1986) ("The bruiis of the action is lhe loss of sexual monopoly alone and Ion of 
eo1UOnium in 0�1cr rcspeclS is unnecessary.''). 
9. RESTATEMENT, Jupra notc 8, § 687; DoBBS, supra note 7, at 1246. 
10. RESTATEMENT, 1upra note 8, § 68S cmt. t; Doeas,1upa note 7, at 1246. 
11. Rober1 C. Brown, The Action for Alienation of Aff«riDnJ, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472, 472 
(1934) \Despite the name which i s  wli11ersaUy gi'ICR to lhls IClion, it is almost unanimously 
agreed that the gist of 11 is not the loss of affcc:tions but 111hcr the loss of coooortiwn-. concept 
of very much broader eontcnL ")(footnote omitted); Nathan P. Feinsingcr, Uglslatfre Attack on 
'"Hean Balm," 33 MJOI. !.. REv. 979, 994 (1935) ("Despite lhe name given to lhc aclion, in 
law lhe injury includes not merely loss of affection bul also services, socieiy, and sexual 
intercourse, as denoted by �1e lcnn 'consortium.' "). 
12. REsTATEMENT, s11pra nolc 8, § 683 & cmts. r, g, I; Hulelmyer v. Cox, Sl4 S.E.2d SS4, 
SS9 (N. C. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 514 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dlJmlssed, 542 
S. E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000). 
13. Feinsingcr, supra note 11, at 994. 
14. "A marriage teetering on lhe brink of domestic disaster should nevertheless be spared 
a sbo11e O\'C! the precipice." Creason v. Myers, 3SO N.W.2d S26, S28 (Neb. 1984); stt also 
Brown. supra note 11, ll 488 (' The weight of aulhoril)' ICelllS to be . .. that total lad: of 
affection between the spouses is not a bar to liabitil)' . . . . [P)laintiff should not be deprived of 
lhe chance, whatever it may be worth, of subsequently effecting a reconciliation wilh his 
spouse."); REsTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 683 cmL f (while maintaining lhat loss of affection 
must be proven by objective indicators, comment also stales that "[ i]f any affeclion rcrnsined, 
its deslruction or di.minulion may be the basis of an action.''); HARPER ET AL, supra note 8, at 
S08-09 (''[O]thers have taken the position lhat there may have been a chance for a reconciliation 
even between estranged spouses and the plaintiff ought not to be deprived of lhat chance or 
ha11e i t  made more remote."). 
IS. Brown, supra DOte 11, 81488; HARPER ET AJ...,supra note 8, at 508. 
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have been sexual relations.16 Indeed, in many cases, the action was brought 
not against a lover who bad committed adultery with the spouse, but against 
parents or other close relatives of the spouse who sought to persuade the 
spouse to leave the plaintiff or otherwise interfered in the marriage.17 As 
with other torts, the causation standard did not require that the wrongful 
conduct of the defendant be the sole cause of the alienation; rather, it was 
stated in terms such as "substantial factor,"18 or "controlling or effective 
cause."19 For a defendant to be liable for alienation of affections, it was 
required that the defendant know or believe that the person whose affections 
were alienated was married.w 
The two tort theories thus are separate theories with distinct elements 21 
and distinguishable historical pedigrees.22 Criminal conversation is "the 
more definite action,"" in that the conduct of the defendant that must be 
proven is adultery, and the damages are recoverable without establishing a 
causal link between any damages and tbe defendant's wrongful conduct. 
Alienation of affections, on the other hand, is the more amo:J>hous action, in 
that various types of conduct, including "mere" persuasion, are actionable, 
and the fact finder must contemplate the chimerical causal link. 
There are similarities between criminal conversation and alienation of 
affections, however. One seldom secs a theoretical discussion of one ton 
without the other. ft has been argued that they are alike in both their private 
function of providing compensation for an injury to a plaintiff and their 
public function of "prevent[ ing] and punish[ ing] intentional interference 
with the husband-wife relationship and the violation of accepted canons of 
social conduct. "25 Moreover, in most cases in which the alleged wrongful 
conduct is adultery, both theories are asserted.26 
16. HARPER ET AL, supra O()(t 8, at 509. 
17. Brown, supra DOie 11, at 483. 
18. RESTATEMENT, supra DOit 8, § 683 ctnl k; DOBBS, supra note 7. at 1246. 
19. Hutelmyer v .  Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999), review denietl, 514 
S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999}, appeal dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211(N.C. 2000). 
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 683 cmt. �DOBBS, supra note 7, at 1246. 
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 683 emt. e; HARPER ET AL, supra DOie 8. at 513. 
22. Feinsinger, supra note 11, at 987; see also infra notes 61-91 and accompanying text 
(discussing historical roots of the torts). 
23. Brown, supra nO!e 11, at 474. 
24. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contrac111al Rela1ionships, 34 
ARK. L. REV. 335, 344-46 (1980). 
25. Feinsinger, supra nO!C 11, at 988-89 (footnote omitted). 
26. See, e.g., Hultlmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554, 559 (N.C. Cl App. 1999), review denied, 
514 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000); �ATEMENT, 
supra note 8, § 683 crnt e; Kay Kavanagh, Note, Alienation of Affections and Criminal 
Conversation: Unholy Marriage in Need of Annulment, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 323, 323 (1981). 
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Most people in the legal profession Jiave taken little note of the passittg 
of these obscure tort theories; .derisively referred to as two of the "heart 
balm" 'torts.27 Since 1935, legislatures and, · less frequently, courts hav� 
discarded these tort theories. Reasons articulated for the abolition of these 
torts usually are selected from a "cookie cutter" list. Most of the reasons, 
articulated by legislatures, courts, . and commentators are superficial and 
lack rigorous analysis.28 . This is· a singular everit. · Who in her right mind 
would throw away a perfectly good tort theory of recovery? It seems 
almost un-American: 
C. An Immodest Hypothetical Revisited: Some Hyperbolic 
Thoughts About the :Torts 
1. Point 
·Because your spouse coµunitted adultery, ·you probably did not live .. in 
one of the minority of states that oohtmue to recognize the tort theories of 
recovery for alienation of affections· or criminal conversation. If you ha� 
odds are your spouse would not" have con;unitted adllltery because there 
would have been few partners who would have risked ruinous financial 
liability as the price for enjoying sexual relations with your otherwise· 
irresistible spouse. Your marriage arid family would have been preserved. 
That would have been good for you b�cause you would have had a faithful · 
and devoted sp0use. With the market closed for extramarital escapadest. 
27. The other two heart balni'lortS are breach of a promise to matty and seduction. Note1 
Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, .83 MICH L. REV. 1770� 1771 n.4 (1985) (describing the 
term as a "sardonic reference to the broken peart" that justified a lawsuit); see also id. at 1778 
("The derisive term 'heartbalm' attached to the breach of promise action is an indication that 
public policy no longer considers money damag�s appropriate for what is perceived as only an 
ordinary broken heart."). 
· 
. 
28. There are courts and commentators, however, that have concluded, after careful and 
well-reasoned analyses, that the torts should not be retained. Professor Dan Dobbs, for 
example, rendered a. thorough and thought-provoking challenge of the "interference tortsH 
generally, including alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Dobbs, supra note 24. 
Dobbs offers . "a modest expression of doubt, in effect notes toward a sceptical [sfo]: 
reconception of the interferencetorts.1' Id: at 337. ·Professor Dobbs' ·expressiops of doubt ate, 
directed more to interference with business or. contractual relations than to alienation of 
affections 'and criminal conversation, but- many of his concerns also apply to these two tort 
theories as specific types of interference torts. See id. at 355 ("To the extent that these problems 
are merely special versions of the interference with contract rules, they furnish. no basis, for 
supporting those rules-they reflect the rules under attack here but do not justify them.")< 
Professor Martha Chamallas has leveled a thoughtful· attack against alienation of affections and 
criminal conversation that en:iphasizes femiiiist concerns. See Chamallas, $Upra note 5, at 
333-42. 
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your spouse either would have to be faithful to you or divorce you, and 
there are substantial 'costs (financial, emotional, etc.) associated with 
divorce. It would have been good for yom children, who may suffer from 
growing up with divorced parents.29 Finally, it would have been good for 
contemporary American society ·which, with almost half of all marriages 
ending in divorce (one of the world's superpowers in divorces),30 is 
suffering all the ill effects that accompany the · decline and fall of the 
traditional nuclear family.· But, alas, you were not fortunate enough to live 
in a state that protects the marital relationship through tort law.. . 
2. Counterpoint 
But suppose that you lived in one of the few states that does recognize 
alienation of affections or criminal conversation. Your spouse simply 
happened to be determined and, against all odds,31 found one of the few 
reckless, sex-crazed persons who would throw caution to the wind and risk 
liability. Having come upon your spouse and partrier in jlagrante delicto, 
you realize that it would be inappropriate to sue your spouse's partner. You 
realize that you and your spouse are autonomous human beings, not each 
other's property, who, notwithstanding your wedding vows and children, 
are free to divorce if you choose to do so. Accordingly, you reason that 
since your spouse could divorce you, you have no right to sue anyone who 
has sex with your spouse while you are still married . . Indeed, you may want 
to remain married, notWithstanding your spouse's adultery. Therefore, it 
simply would not be fair to: sue the person who interfered with your 
marriage. Moreover, on reflection, you realize that your spouse's adultery 
may not be the fault of the potential defendant.. It is likely that you have 
driven your spouse to this end and ·thus made your spouse available to the 
partner. Had you been a better �arriage companion, this might not have 
29. See, e.g., JUDITH w ALLERSTEIN ET AL, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE 
(2000). 
30. Joan Lowy, U.S. Divorce, Marriage Rates on the Decline, ·DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 3, 
2000, at 8 .  See generally GLENDA RILEY, D IVORCE:· AN AMERICAN TRADITION 190 (1991) 
(concluding that family will "survive and adapt" in America, but ''Americans will divorce"). 
The United States does · not have the highest . divorce rate in the world. Walter Kim, 
Divorce/The Debate: Should You Stay Together for the Kids? nME, Sept. 25, 2000, at 74. 
Russia (65%), Sweden (64%), Finland (56%), and Britain (53%) have higher rates than the 
United States' 49%. Id. But the United States � just behind the countries with a rate of 
50% or more. Id. · 
· 
31. See AGAINST ALL ODDS (Columbia TriStar 1984) (bad movie with a lot of sex and a 
lust triangle, but a great title song by Phil Collins). Although this footnote seems superfluous, I 
do wish to make a point later abOut movies, television; and other media, and adultery and 
society's values. 
· 
· 
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happened. This realization moves you and causes you to apologize to your 
spouse and the partner who seem somewhat unreceptive during their frantic 
efforts to make themselves more presentable. As you further 
dispassionately consider the matter, you realize that many people have 
affairs in contemporary American society, and if you sue and the idea 
catches on, you may make adultery less fashionable and less available. 
Who knows, you may want to engage in adultery yourself some dayl 
Finally, although your sexual ego has srtffered a not insignificant blow, you 
decide to be assertive and self-affirming, and you refuse to be viewed as a 
pathetic victim who blames your sad state on your spouse and your spouse's 
paramour. Having considered all this, you walk away, chuckling to 
yourself about how archaic are laws that permit one to sue a person for 
having sex with one's spouse. For many good reasons, you have decided 
that you will not avail yourself of those laws. When it comes to sex, it is a 
jungle out there. Or, come to think of it, in modem terms, it is like a free 
market. Although you are hurt, you know that less government regulation 
of the market is always better. Competition is always the best policy' 
choice. 
D. With a Bang or a Whimper? 
Although alienation of affections and criminal conversation are fading 
from American tort law, a case in North Carolina a few years ago 
temporaril! brought these old, odd torts to the nation's collective 
attention;3 that is to say, the case attracted extensive media attention and 
generated tantalizing headlines and sound bytes, including coverage in "The 
3 2. Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 514 
S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000). The Hutelmyer case 
was the most high-profile case, but there were three North Carolina jury verdicts awarding 
substantial damages for alienation of affections and criminal conversation in 1997. Jennifer E. 
McDougal, Legislating Morality: The Actions for Alienation of Affections and Criminal 
Conversation in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 163,  177 (1 998). In January of 
1997, a North Carolina jury awarded a wife $1 . 2  million agains t her husband's secretary. Id. at 
177 n. l 09. The jury viewed videotape footage of the husband of seventeen years and his 
secretary having intercourse on the office floor. Id. The tape was produced by a camera placed 
in the conference room by a detective hired by the plaintiff-wife. Id. at 177 n. 109 (citing Poon 
Rhee, Jury: Husband-Stealing Secretary Owes $1 Million to Man's Ex-Wife, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Aug. 9, 1997, at IA). In the third case, the jury applied a formula of $100 for each 
day of the defendant's affair with the plaintiff's wife, plus $50,000 in damages for criminal 
conversation and $100,000 in punitive damages to arrive at a damages award of $243,000 for 
the aggrieved husband. Id. at 1 77-78. See also $1.4 Million Awarded in Alienation Lawsuit, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), May 24, 2001 , A4 (reporting on an alienation of affection verdict 
which is thought to be the largest in the state). 
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Nation's Newspaper,"33 on television news magazine shows,34 and a made­
for-television movie.35 Dorothy Hutelmyer sued her husband's secretary 
(and next wife), Margie Cox, for having an affair with her husband and 
allegedly thereby taking him away from her after eighteen years of 
marriage. 36 Mrs. Hutelmyer (Dorothy) won a jury verdict awarding her a 
million dollars-half a million in compensatory damages and half a million 
in punitive damages. My suspicion is that the media embraced the case not 
because it presented fascinating legal issues, but because it was about 
primal human drives and emotions-sex, passion, infidelity, and revenge. 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals appeared to be sympathetic to the 
defendant's argument that the tort theories of alienation of affections and 
criminal conversation should be abolished, but the majority declared that it 
was not its prerogative to overrule or ignore clear decisions of the state 
supreme court. 37 Moreover, as one opinion in the case noted, the North 
Carolina legislature had recently defeated a bill that would have abolished 
the cause of action for alienation of affections. 38 
The typical responses to the anomaly of North Carolina's retention of 
these two torts have been polarized. One position, only somewhat 
hyperbolically stated, is that, while the rest of the nation is "going to hell in 
a handbasket," North Carolina stands as the guardian of morality, the 
33. See Carrie Hedges, North Carolina Taking Cheating Hearts to Task, USA 'IbDA Y, 
Sept. 19, 1997, at 3A; Karen S. Peterson, Million-Dollar Message from Ex-Wife, Jury, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 8, 1997, at ID. 
34. E.g., Dateline NBC: Three's Company; Woman Accused of Breaking Up Marriage 
Sued by Ex-Wife (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 15, 1997). Co-anchor Jane Pauley's lead-in 
demonstrates why alienation of affections and criminal conversation are good grist for the 
popular media mill: 
Id. 
If hell hath no fury like a woman scorned, wait till you see what happens 
when she gets a good lawyer and a sympathetic jury. Tonight, the story of a 
married man who left his wife for someone else. It happens all the time. But 
this story has a stunning twist, the woman left behind decided there should be 
a price for a marriage destroyed. But he won't have to pay it. 
35. The Price of a Broken Heart (Lifetime television broadcast, Aug. 16, 1999). 
36. The Hutelrnyers were married on October 14, 1978. Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d at 557. 
During their marriage, they had three children. Id. Mr. Hutelrnyer "left the marital home" on 
January 5, 1996. Id. A divorce followed. Id. On May 15, 1997, Mr. Hutelrnyer married Ms. 
Cox. Id. 
37. Id. at 562. 
38. Id. at 563 (Hunter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Legislative 
Tally: Capital Correspondence-How Triangle Members of the General Assembly Voted on 
Bills of Note, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 19, 1999, at A3 (reporting that bill to abolish 
common law civil actions of alienation of affections and criminal conversation failed by vote of 
55-58). 
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nemesis of adulterers, and the savior of families and marriages. 39 The 
diametrically opposed position is that old-fashioned and unenlightened 
North Carolina has perpetuated legal relics from an era when women were 
regarded as the property of husbands, and the torts serve no good purpose in 
contemporary society. 40 Very few in the legal· community defend. the 
continued existence of these torts.41 Aside from the Hutelmyer cause 
celebre, the abrogation of these torts has attracted little attention, and they 
soon may be gone. Will they be missed? 
E. Worth Considering From Perspectives of Tort Law and Society 
From the perspective of American tort law as it evolved in the twentieth 
century, the abrogation of alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation, the near unanimity of that change, and the facile recitation of 
reasons are remarkable.42 The reasons given in 1935 by Indiana, Illinois, 
and New York when these states abolished these torts were a smoke 
screen43 and should be debunked once and for all.44 Since that time, courts, 
legislators, and commentators have continued to recite those same 
unpersuasive reasons for abolishing or not recognizing the torts. 
39. Editorial, Alienation of Affections: Unfashionable but Handy-North Carolina 
Shouldn't Worry About Being Old-Fashioned, NEWS & REc. (Greensboro), Aug. 9, 1997, at A8; 
Cindi Andrews, Love's Legal Loss, NEWS & REc. (Greensboro), Aug. 16, 1997, at A81. The 
Andrews article quotes the Reverend Don Carter, Pastor of the Baptist Temple of Alamance 
County: "I certainly hope [the Hutelmyer verdict] sends out a strong signal to people that 
adultery is wrong .. .. I'm afraid today that through television and the film industry and books, 
we have glorified infidelity, almost made it a game." Id. 
40. See Andrews, supra note 39. The article quotes University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill Law School Professor Sally Sharp: "It derives from the time when, if you took my wife, it 
was comparable to stealing my cow . . . . The continued existence of these medieval causes of 
action is a disgrace to the state of North Carolina." Id. See also Sally Kalson, A Cheating 
Husband Is Hardly.a Victim, PITI. POST-GAZETIF., Sept. 22, 1997, at B l  ("It's a quaint notion, 
likening a spouse to a piece of private property that can be stolen from its rightful owner like a 
lawnmower."). See also Jill Jones, Comment, Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of Affections 
and Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1998) (quoting lawyers and 
law professors). 
41. See Terry Carter, 'She Done Me Wrong,' AB.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 24. 
42. Even as the abrogation bandwagon began to roll in 1935, there were some expressions 
of surprise. An article by a Fordham law professor published the year after heart balm 
legislation was ·enacted in Indiana, Illinois, and New York, questioned the wisdom of the 
legislation and termed it "almost unprecedented." Frederick L. Kane, Heart Balm and Public 
Policy, 5 FORDHAM L. REv. 63, 63 (1936). Another of the early articles discussing the "attack" 
on the torts referred to the "unusual legislative receptivity'' to efforts to abolish the torts. 
Feinsinger, supra note 11, at 979. 
43. Kane, supra note 42, at 71 (''having had one important change in our fundamental law 
foisted upon us under a smoke screen of false agitation"). 
44. For such a debunking, see infra notes 129-201 and accompanying text. 
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If the reasons originally given for abrogation of the torts are without 
merit, did better reasons exist at that time or have other reasons arisen since 
that time that justify nonrecognition? American tort law has changed in 
ways that seem inconsistent with the abrogation of these torts or the failure 
to reconsider them. Tort law has expanded substantially and recognized 
several new tort theories.•5 Thus, where victims of injuries have been 
identified, ton law generally has sought to provide remedies. During that 
snme period of tort expansion, few established theories of recovery have 
been eliminated by most states.46 Old tort theories of recovery have been 
expanded or revised to bring novel and contemporary fact patterns within 
their covcrage.'7 Moreover, American tort law has shifted its virtually 
exclusive focus on protecting the "hard" interests of person and property, 
and increasingly protected "soft" interests in relationships and emotions . ., 
4S. Consider, for example, invasion of privlC)', mtcntional infliction of emotional distress, 
and wrongful 1emuna11on. Reprding these ION 1nd lhc char8cteristics of proposed or 
emerging ION that indicate the likelihood of lhcir success, sec Anila Bems1ein, How to Maki a 
Nrw Ton: 71orttParodoxu, 1S TtX. L REV. 1539 (1997). 
46. Dobbs, S11pro no1c 24, 11 355 ("(l)t is interestina IO notice Iha! one or lhc few 
tcndcnc1ca IO constnct liability in ion has occumd in (mterfe"'nce wilh marriage]."): stt also 
Donald C. Dowling. Jr., if Controc:t 17reory for a Complex Ton: Limiting lnterf•,.•nce \t.iltlt 
ConlmCt B<'yond the Un/a,.ful M<'ans Tut, 40 U. MIAMI L REV. 487, 489 (1986) ("[T]he besl 
modem example or rcsnictina ton liabohty deals with an action c\ofcly "'laled 10 lhc 
inlerfCJence ions: cnminal convc1$ation."). 
47. See. <'.g., Rohen M. Ackenn&I\ Tort Law and Comnounlturlan/Jno: Jllloere Rights Meet 
RtspenSlbWtia, 30 WAK£ FOREST L. REV. 649, 651 (1995) ("Dilling lhc past thirty ycais, lhc 
protections furnished by the law of tons have eo<pandcd, and wit\ lhat expension has come an 
augmcn111ion of 1he du11es owed 10 one's fellow citluns."); Dowling, supra no1e 46, at 488 
("'The lus1ory of ton law in the twentieth ccniury is one of expansion. Historically, those who 
ba''C uJU<d against the spread of liAbility have o�n done so in vain. j. Mr. Dowling docs 
note, however, lhat lhc interfemicc tons, in which he includes in1erf=nce with c:ontr.u:t and 
interference wilh business "'lations, do not fit lhe paltem or expansion, having grown no 
broader than in the mid-ninetecnlh ccnrury. Id. An example of a new duty is an emerging duty 
to rescue undc:r some circumstances. See garually Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty 
10 RUOI<', 4 7 v AND. L. REY. 673 ( 1994). Another duty recopoiud only in �cnl year$ is lhc 
duty 10 protect agllinst third-party criminal activity, even bcyoad the boundaries of business 
premises. Su, ,.,g., Banks v. Hyau Co!J>., 722 F.2d 214 (5tb Cir. 1984). Old ion lhcories, such 
11 battery, ha,·c been applied 10 new flict si111alions such 11 sexual int=owsc bdwcen spouses 
when one has engaged in an extramariial affair. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994) (more 
about this case later). A di!TCJent view or the recent hi.story of 1on Jaw is offered by Professor 
David Robenson, whom I thank for pointing out that lhc last IWcnty years or so has been a 
period of contmction in ton law. Examples of such contnlc1ion mclude the recopoi1ion of new 
defenses 10 tort liability and limi1ations of products liability. 
48. Nancy Levi� Ethereal Torts, 61 GOO. WASH. L. R£v. 136 (1992); if. Martha 
Ownallas, � Arrhit«llln of Bias: Dl!<'p S1n1etuns in Ton Law, 146 U. PA. L. Rf.v. 463, 
489-502 (1998) (recognizing liberalization in ton law in recognition of rte0vay for emotional 
and "'lational injuries, but 11gUing lhat the"' is still an "implicit hienuchy of value" in which 
physical injury and propc:ny loss arc considered mo"' valuable). 
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Some of the types of relationships for which tort law provides redress for 
injuries include family, community, political, employment, and trade .. 49 
Given these trends in modem tort law; who would have predicted that most 
states would discard two tort theories with historical pedigrees that purpolt 
to protect against . or redress injury to emotional well-being in the most 
sacrosanct of all relationships-· the family? 50 
From the perspective .of American society, from which tort law derives 
the . values and interests for which it . provides redress when injuries ar:e 
sustained, it is not easy to explain why legislatures and courts have been 
willing to eradicate alienation of affections and criminal conversatio� 
These torts are said to protect the interest people .have against interferenea 
in their family relations. 51 · Most Ainericans say that families52 and 
marriage53 are important to them . .  Moreover, in polls, most Americans sa, 
they consider adultery morally wrong.-54 For the last two decades, "familJ 
49. In a four-part series of articles, Professor Leon Green described the role of tort law i':n 
protecting relational interests. Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 IU.. L. REV. 460, 46i 
(1934) (part one: discussing family relations); 29 ILL L. REv. 1041 (1935) (part two: discussing 
trade relations); 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935) (part three: discussing commercial relations); 30 ILI.. 
L. REV. 3 14 (1935) (part four: discussing professional and political relations). 
50. Professor Feinsinger described the public and private functions of both tort theories llllJ 
compensating for a loss. of consortium injury and '4prevent[ing] and punish[ ingl intentiotlli'I 
interference with the husband-wife relationship and the · violation of accepted canons of soci'll1: 
conduct." Feinsinger, supra note 1 1 , at 988·89; cf. Brown, supra note 1 1 , at 472 (describittg 
purpose of alienation of affections as ''protecting marital relations from unjustifiabl� 
interference by outsiders"). 
51. See DoBBS, suprrz note 7, at 1245-55 (discussing "interference with famil:gi 
relationships"). 
52. One need only listen to politicians' speeches to appreciate the importance of talking 
about family values. Indeed, most Americans say that family is more important to them tba1'll 
money and wealth. See, e.g., Jeff Kunerth, AA.RP Says Americans Value Family Over Riches ar 
Orlando, Fla., Convention, ORLA.Noo SENTINEL (May 17, 2000) (discussing AA.RP SUl'VeJ 
commissioned by Modern Mrzturity magazine in which eighty percent of those surveyed defined 
success as having a good family, marriage, and education, whereas only tw�ty-seven percettt 
measured success in terms of wealth). Notwithstanding Americans' professed devotion -
family and family values, the "traditional family" is diminishing as a reality. 
53. Although it is safe to say that Americans today will say tbat they cherish family, 
American society seems equivocal on the·matter of inarriage. Michael A. Fletcher, For Bettel? 
or Worse, Marriage Rates Hit a Low; Study R,.eports New Lows for Marriage Rates an d Weddt!I 
Bliss, WASH. POST, July 2, 1999, at Al. Divorce rates soared until the mid-1980s, with the ra� 
leveling off slightly below fifty percent See James Herbie DiFonzo, <;:ustomized Marriage, � 
IND. L.J. 875, 877-78 (2000). The cover of a recent issue of Time magazine had ·a photograpll 
of the cast of the Home Box Office series Sex and the City and bore the caption, 'JWho Needs . .  a 
Husband?" 'IlME, Aug. 28, 2000. The accompanying story discusses the phenomenon of womet1 
deciding not to marry. Tamala M. Edwards, Flying Solo, 'IlME, Aug. 28, 2000. According tQ 
the story, forty percent of adult females are single compared with thirty percent in 1960. Id. 
54. See, e.g., AllPolitics, How Do Americans View Adultery?, at http://www.cnn.com1 
ALLPOLmCS/1998/08/20/adultery.poll/ (Im visited Jan. 2, 2001); Bruce Handy, How J98 
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and family values" have been the rallying cries of a movement to restore 
traditional values in contemporary American society. 55 Why then, are 
legislators and state judges, many of whom are elected, willing to take 
actions that may be characterized as not supportive of family or marriage?56 
What has changed in American law and American society that bas 
caused the eradication of these torts? Is adultery no longer considered a 
devastating injury to a spouse?57 Do socia.I mores and public policy no 
longer support attempting to prevent people from interfering with exclusive 
sexual relations in marriage? Aic the torts simply ineffective to redress the 
injury or effect the public policy? 
This article has two objectives. One is to examine what forces in law 
and society brought about the demise of two well-established torts over a 
sixty-five year period.sa Why did these old, established torts not embark on 
new careers? The other objective is to suggest that, for jurisdictions that 
have abrogated, or consider abrogating, criminal conversation and 
alienation of affections, a modified tort of intentional interference with 
Really Feel About Fide/tty, 'nME, Aug. 31, 1998. 1.n a 1998 CNN/Time poll, eighty-six pe.rcent 
(86%) responded that adultery was morally wrong, compared with seventy-six percent (76%) in 
1977. AllPolitics, supra. 
SS. See. e.g., Fraooes I!. Olsen, The Famtly and the Market: A Study of Ideology and legal 
Re/onn, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (1983) (discussing "[a) n<:w round or debate . . .  
regarding the family and family values''); Murphy, supra note 6, at 1112-14 (discussing 
commentators' calls for "renewed anontion to 'morality' in family law"). 
S6. In the Idaho case abolishing criminal conversation, the Idaho Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to pledge its commitment to marriage: "While this Court docs not condone adultery 
and continues to hold marriage in the highest esteem, we are persuaded, for the reasons given, 
that the action pursued by (plaintiff] docs not serve to protect the institution of marriage." Neal 
v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 81S (Idaho 1994). 
S1. 3 WJLUAM BLACKSTONF, CoMMENTARIES •140 (1768). Referring to the civil injury 
aspect or adultery or criminal conversation, Blackstone said "(s ]urely there can be no greater." 
Id. 
S8. In a more limited context, I anempt the inveru: of what Professor Anita Bernstein did 
in her article, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, supra note 4S, at 1544-59. Professor 
Bernstein examined the characteristics of new torts that have succeeded in garnering general 
recognition. Id. I examine what legal and social forces brought about the demise or two well· 
established tori theories. It is: interesting to note that the cbaraC1eristics or successful tort 
wannabes, if applied to criminal conversation and alienation of affections, would tend to predict 
success, Bernstein posits that conservatism is the enemy or aspiring torts. Id. at 1543. Criminal 
conversation and alienation or affections seem to have a strong conservative base. The specific 
characteristics that Bernstein identifies which favor recognition arc lacking novelty (being 
grounded in common law rules), being less tort-like and more finnly rooted in contract and 
property, and being portrayed as free or individual hwnan creation or sponsorship. Id. at 
1544-59. The old torts or criminal conversation and alienation or affections can claim all of 
those charac,teristics. Ironically, property and contract connections have proved detrimental to 
the torts, fueling the powerful spouse-as-property criticism. 
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marriage should be reco�ed. 59 Th� proposed modified tort is created 
from elements selected frotn criminal conversation . and alienation of 
affections. It gives the old torts a: new career. 
In the final analysis, l am not sanguine about the longevity of criminal 
conversation or alienation of affections in. the few jurisdictions that cling to 
them. Nor am I optimistic about a groundswell of·support for the revised 
interference with marriage tort offered herein as an alternative to the old 
torts. First, the ideal of the marriage relationship with exclusive sexual 
relations is not desired or valued by Americans as much as it is politically 
expedient for policymakers to say it · is. Society recognizes that the 
prevalent state · of affairs is ·the existence and tolerance of competitive 
conduct (interference or attempted interference) by third parties that 
59. In this sec9nd objective, I must face the uphill battle that Professor Bernstein describes 
in How To Make a New Tort: Three Pqradoxes. Bernstein, supra note 45. Note, that I try to 
avoid the damning characteristics (identified by Professor Bernstein) of novelty and individual 
sponsorship by styling this. tort a ''modified" tort. My proposal to reconsider the old heart balm 
torts is not, however, avant garde. Two scholars · who are sympathetic to feminist issues have 
called for reconsideration of the other two, heart balm torts . . Professor .Jane Larson called for 
recognition of a new tort of sexWtl fraud, drawing from· the old tort of seduction. Jane E. 
Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit "'; A Feminist 
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COL{JM. L. REV. 374, 379. (1993). Although not proposing a new 
tort, Professor Mary Goomb� revisits the role of feminists in advocating abolition of the tort of 
breach of a promise to marry. Mary Coombs, .A.gency and Partnership: A Study of Breach of 
Promise Plaintiffe, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1,  1 1.:17 (1989). 
I do not argue· that the · other heart balm torts, breach of a promise to marry and seduction, 
are worth· preserving or resurrecting. Those torts pose greater problems than alienation of 
affections . and criminal conversatiQi:l, and they do . not serve as great a public purpose. 
F einsinger, supra note · 1 1, at 1008-()9. In. one of the earliest articles applauding the legislative 
abrogations of the heart balm torts,' Professor Feinsinger recognized that distinctions could be· 
drawn: 
There will be little regret at the passing of the action for breach of promise to 
marry. But there is room for an honest difference of opinion as to the actions 
of alienation of affections and possibly of criminal conversation, which have 
long been sanctioned as indemnifying private injury, preserving the family 
unit and punishing publk: offen$Cs. 
Id. at 1008;.see also HARi>ER ET AL, supra note 8, at 535 (questioning whether "all four actions 
should be lumped together," and noting that breach-of-promise to marry is more likely 
susceptible of improper use than is alienation of affections). 
I think it is unfortunate that alienation of affections and criminal conversation became 
inextricably intertwin.ed with breach of a promise to marry and seduction in the maligned 
category of ''heart balm" torts. See Larson; ·supra note 59, at 394 n.85 (explaining that breach­
of-promise to marry was. the primary target of the · anti-heart balm movement). The first 
legislation passed to abolisn heart balm torts; the Indiana Act of 1935, eliminated all of the torts 
in one fell swoop, and that legislation served as the model for later legislation. See Feinsinger, 
supra note 1 1, at 998-1008. Professor Kane, writing in 1936, noted that the one common 
characteristic of these differe�t causes of action was "sexual misbehavior." Kane, supra note 
42, at 65: 
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challenges the exclusive intimacy of marriages. Second, the signature 
features of American society are its free-market, capitalist economy and its 
democratic government. The dominant aspects of this society have become 
competition, libertarianism, and individual autonomy and rights. Generally, 
we like our markets, whether commercial or sexual relations, open and 
competitive; in such a society, "interference torts" are not likely to be 
favorcd.60 Third, the last century has seen an incremental shift in power 
from males to females, with females finding a voice to express themselves 
in society and law. Many women and female legal scholars have favored 
the abolition of these torts because they treat women as inferior and 
subordinate to men and as helpless victims of the power of men. It is not 
clear to me that abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of 
affections was in the best interest of women, or that continued 
nonrecognition of the torts is in the best interest of women. Nonetheless, I 
do not think that feminist scholars or politicians are likely to support 
retention of the old torts or adoption of a revised tort. Perhaps I will be 
surprised. 
Part II of this article briefly discusses the historical roots of the torts of 
criminal conversation and alienation of affections, their general acceptance 
in the United States, and their eventual general rejection. Part III Slates the 
reasons commonly articulated for abrogation of the torts and explains why 
those reasons are generally unpersuasive. Part rv undertakes to explain the 
changes in the context of evolving tort law and social values and morality. 
The discussion in part rv provides a more cogent explanation for the 
abolition of the torts than the reasons usually articulated. Part V presents 
reasons for recognizing a revised tort theory of intentional interference with 
marriage. Part VI describes the revised tort theory. 
60. See Dobbs, supra noce 24, at 336; see also Paul D. Caning10n, A Senate of Flvo: An 
Essay on Sexuality and Law, 23 GA. L. REv. 859, 869 (1989) (dcscn'bing the positions on legal 
regulation of se< taken by his hypothetical "Sexual Libenarian Senator"-allowing individual 
selection and "free flow" with little regula!ion-as "eongJUellt not ooly with capitalism, but also 
with the political traditions of democracy, embracing both individual freedom and equal rights 
to sclf-advancementj. 
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II. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF 
AFFECTIONS: AN ABRIDGED HISTORY 
A. Pedigree 
The laws of many societies throughout history have declared adultery to 
be illegal and punishable. 61 Some other generalizations can: be made 
regarding anCient civilizations' laws regarding adultery. A man was 
permitted to kill the seducer of his wife with no legal repercussions for 
himself. 62 Also, married women who committed adultery were treated 
more harshly than married men: who committed adultery. 63 Moreover, the 
punishments meted out were often gruesome and barbaric, such as the 
mutilation of the adulteress or the devouring of her by dogs. 64 Some 
punishments were intended publicly to disgrace the adulteress, such as the 
infamous "running of the gauntlet" in the nude or semi-nude. 65 The reasons 
61.  See generally Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery-A Synopsis, 1 J. FAM. L. 
89 (1961). 
62. In many societies throughout history, the law excused killings under such 
circumstances, although some required a discovery such as that described in the hypothetical at 
the beginning of this article-adulterers engaged in jlagrante delicto. For example, in England 
in the ninth century, the laws of Alfred the Great provided that a man could fight without 
becoming liable to vendetta if he caught another man engaged in sexual relations with his wife, 
daughter, sister, or mother. Alfred 43 § 7 (cited in TuE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH 
KINGS 85 (F.L. Attenborough ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1963) (1922)); Murray, supra note 61, 
at 99-100 (noting that under the laws of William I, although the state was prohibited from 
inflicting death for adultery, the husband (and father and son) were permitted to do so, 
apparently on the rationale that "[a]ggrieved husbands were going to kill the parties no matter 
what the law prohibited"); see also JEAN BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LA w 139 
(Augustus M. Kelley 1968) (1912) (noting that, "[ i]n the latest stage of the law," a husband lost 
the right to kill his wife if he catches her in the act, although it was not too difficult to obtain a 
pardon if he carried out the execution). 
63. BRISSAUD, supra note 62, at 139-40 ("Civil legislation never treated adultery of the 
husband as it did that of the wife.") ; Murray, supra note 61, at 89 ("The man paid a fine and the 
woman was burned alive."). 
64. Murray, supra note 61,  at 92-93, 95. The laws of Manu are particularly gruesome for 
both the adulterous spouse and the partner:. 
If a woman made insolent by (the rank of) her family, or by (her own) 
parts (beauty, wealth, etc. ,) should prove false to her husband, the king 
shoul.d have her devoured by dogs in some much-frequented place. 
He should cause the evil man to be burned on a glowing hot iron couch, 
· and they shall place pieces of wood about it till the evil-doer is consumed. 
Id. at 95-96 (citing HOPKINS, THE ORDINANCES OF MANU VII-XIVII, at 237 (1891)). 
65. BRISSAUD, supra note 62, at 137-38 n.7; Murray, supra note 61, at 103; see also Jacob 
Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REY. 65 1, 654 n. 19 (1930). Writing 
about the running of the gauntlet penalty for adultery, Brissaud notes that "it turned into the 
obscene and burlesque, so much so that the penalty was more scandalous than the offense 
itself." BRISSAUD, supra note 62, at 137-38. 
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for the illegality and the harsh punishments differ with different societies 
and periods of history, but several major reasons can be identified: sin, 
bastardization of family line, destruction of unity of the family, and 
violation of a man's property right. M One commentator suggests that 
common to all societies that declared adultery illegal was the notion that 
adultery is an affront to a man's pride, being forced to recognize that 
another man is sexually superior and thus is able to lure away the cuckold's 
wife.67 The history of legal treatment of adultery has not been a proud one, 
but it does attest to the seriousness of the injury inflicted on the spouse and, 
pemaps, the society. 
The immediate historical roots of the American torts of alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation are in seventeenth century English law. 
Although alienation of affections was not recognized in England, it is of the 
lineage of the tort of seduction or enticing away of a servant. 61 Blackstone 
enumerated three causes of action that a husband might bring for injuries 
relating to his interests in his wife: abduction or taking away of the wife, 
adultery or criminal conversation, and beating or otherwise abusing the 
wife.69 The basis of the torts in England is traced 10 the rule, recognized at 
least by the thirteenth century, that a master could recover from a person 
who beat or otherwise injured his servant or apprcntice.10 There were three 
features of the action: I) violence had 10 be used against the servant; 2) the 
action was for the loss of the service, and was distinct from the action given 
10 the injured servant for his injury; and 3) there was not a requirement of a 
contract between a master and servant-the action was given because there 
was a state of service, and the service was lost due 10 injury. 71 
66. Mwny, supra nOle 61, at 89. One of the reuons, bastardization or WlClenainty 
regarding pa1emi1y, explains in pan why adultery by a wife was considered worse and was 
treated more hanhly; WlClCRainty regarding paternity could rcaull in family property pas.sing to 
strangers. 81USSAVD, supra noll: 62. at 140; Lippman, supra note 65. al 655. 
67. Mwny, supra DOie 61, at 89. 
68. IWtPER ET AL, supra DOil: 8, &I 504 (''Today few would regard the "lbduc:tion' or 
'COiic rnau' of a wife as a trespass ag&ns:! the husband oo the theory that the wife is incapable 
of giving consent or oo any theory that the husband bas a 'properly intcnst' in htt body. The 
usual actioo in many jurisdictions is for alienation of affections of either spou5t: • • • •  "); Gregory 
L. Thompson. NOie, �Suit of Aliaiation of Afftt:lions: Can Its E:rutf'lfll Be JUJ tijitd Today?, 
S6 N.D. L. REY. 239, 241 (1980 )(explaining that the ion of abduction, based oo the husband's 
proprietaJy interest in his wife, became unacccpcable in America and was replaced by 1bc ion of 
alienation of afTec1ioo.s). 
69. 3 BLACKSTON!', supra noll: 57, at • t39; QuiM v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 334 n.11 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (citing 81..ACKSTON:E's COMMEHTAIUES). 
70. Dobbs, supra DOil: 24, at 338; Lippman, supra DOie 65, at 653. 
71. John H. Wiporc, Interference ll'ilh Social Relations, 21 Av.. L. JlEv. 764, 765-66 
(1887). 
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In 1350, the Ordinance of Labourers was enacted in England in response 
to labor shortages resulting from a great plague. The ordinance bound 
laborers, free and bound, to remain in the service to which they were bound, 
and imposed a jail sentence on a laborer for a violation. The ordinance also 
created a remedy for the employer against any person who received and 
retained a servant. This statutory action, unlike the common law action, 
required ru1 express contract to serve for a definite term. 72 Thereafter, the 
two actions, common law and statutory, became mixed. 73 The action for 
trespass on a wife developed separately from an action de trespass facra 
feminre, which was brought jointly by husband and wife.74 However, the 
loss of service doctrine, first recognized in the context of masters and 
servants, came to be applied to the husband-wife relationship so that a 
husband had an action for the loss, through violence, of bis wife's 
consortium. 75 The next extension was to permit recovery when the loss of 
consortium was due to enticement rather than an act of violence perpetrated 
on the wife, although there was no supporting precedent for such 
recovery. 76 The English cases did not recognize an action for simple 
alienation of affections; rather, the injury was that the wife was enticed to 
leave her husband's home. n 
Finally, with the different doctrines and statutes rcgardina recovery for 
loss of services by a servant mixing and merging, the requirement of 
violence was lost, and the term "servant" was enlarged from its original 
meaning. These developments led to the recognition of a broad new 
principle of contract law in 1853 in Lumley v. Gye71 that interference by 
persuasion with any contractual relationship was actionable.19 
72. Id. at 766. 
73. Id. at 766-67; see also Note, Torrlous Interference with Contractual Relations in the 
Ninetttnth �ntury: The TNlnsformat/on of Property. Contract. and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
ISIO, !SIS o.22 (1980) (noting that statutory causes of action were incorporated into the 
common law by the end of the 18th century). 
74. Wigmore, supra oote 71, at 769. 
75. Id. Modem characterizations of criminal conversatioo u having been based oo 
recognition of a husband's property interest Ui his wife are correct. See, e.g., 8 'MLLIAM 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY Of' ENGLISH LAW 430 (1925) (''The husband's interest in bis wife's 
consortium, unlike the parent's interest in the consortium of his children, wu coosidcred 10 be 
sufficiently proprietary to support an action of trespass."); see also Lippmal\ s11pra note 6S, at 
651-73 (discussing the property basis for the tort). 
76. Wigmore, supra note 71, at 769 (citing Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes 5n, 125 Eng. 
Rep. 1330 (1745)); see also Fcinsinger, supra OOle 11, at 992 (citing Winsmore). 
77. Feinsinger,supro OOIC ll,at992 n.7S. 
78. 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). 
79. Wigmore,supra ootc 71, at 770; sec also Note, supra oote 73, at 1522-24 (discussing 
the three ways in which Lumley ''transfooncd" the p11>cxisiring law of third-party interference). 
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B. Acceptance 
The husband's right of action was recognized early in the United Sttates80 
in all states except Louisiana, which did not recognize either criminal 
conversation or alienation of affections.11 The Married Women's Property 
Acts were passed, giving women a number of rights, including rights to 
retain earnings, own property, and bring suit on their own bebalf.12 The 
80. New York was the 61$1 stale lO reeollJliu the tort of alienation of 1ffections in 
lleennaoce v. James, 47 Barb. 120 {N.Y. Oen. Tenn 1866). Stt, t.g .. PROSSER, supra llOIC 7, 
§ 124, at 918 n.29 (citina Httrmanc• as first case in the United States to recognize alienotion of 
affections); ste also Kavantgh. supra note 26, at 328 (same). 
81. This is only pan.ially correct. The LouisiaM Supremo Court definitively rojec•cd the 
theory of alienation of affections in 1927. Moulin v. Monteleone, I IS So. 447 (La. 1927). 
However, a panel of the court had appea�d 10 recognize such o right of �covery in 1924. 
Hennessey v. Wahloa, 99 So. 40S (ta. 1924). In fltnnusry, the plainti!I' brouaht an action 
wbeii bis wife's parents alleaedly abducled her, detained her, and alienated her 1ffections 
ioward lier husband, and dmied plaintilT acceu 10 his wife. The maniqc occurred after 
pl»ntiff and !us fllllCCC eloped. Citina Civil Code Article 231 s OD cklictual liability, the COWi 
staled as follows: 
[TJhe hust.nd 11 legally entitled to the possession and society or his wife, 
and lO her lid and assisw>ce. as Iona. u he complies ,.;th the obligations 
arising from the contract of rrwriage. 
Any Invasion or such marital rights, whether by the father or �"' mother 
of the wife. or by a third penon, without ju.11 or reasonable cause, necessarily 
coiutirutes an 1c1 �suiting in damages 10 him, and imposes upon the 
aespasser, by whose rau11 it happened, lhc obligation or� the injwy. 
Id. &1 406 (ciuotion omitled). 
When the Lowsiant Supreme Coon decided Mou/111 lbou1 tbtcc years Ja1er, it re)CCud the 
idea thn &II action for abenation of alfcclions cvo; had been recognized in the state. Reaarchng 
HDflltSUY, ftnl, the ooun made the dubious distinction lhlt the cause of action OD which the 
Hennasey court allowed �ery was slander, not •h�111tion of affections. Second, 1hc ooun 
noled that, �ardless of whit Hennusey held, it was not binding on the Moulin coun because it 
was decided dwing a brief period of time when the six-member Louisiana Supreme Coun was 
divided inio two sections of �e justice; each. Moreover, of the �e justices who decided the 
case, one was serving temporarily, and another was no longer on the court al the time Moulin 
was decided. 
The Moulin coun gave four reasons for not recognizing an aclion for alienation of affections 
• a time when a majority or staia did recogniu it First, damages for alienation of affections 
are punitive or exemplary, and Louisiana law does not authorize awarding punitive damages in 
civil actions. Moufl1t, I IS So. at 448. Second, Louisiana's Civil Code declared maniaae 10 be a 
civil connect, and Louisiana law did not (and except in limited cilClllllSlanCe still does DOI) 
rec:ogni:ze a cause or action for third-pany interfercnoe with a contrac1. Id. at 449. Third. under 
Louisiana law, a husband had no propeny inte�st in the companionship, services, or dfections 
of his wife. Id. at 4S l. Finally, Article 2294 of the Code of 1825, the precursor of Article 23 IS, 
would not suppon such an action because it was. subject to the constructions and limitations of 
the jurisprudence or Rome and France, and, the court asscned, "[ ijt is cenain that unckr the 
Roman and Spanish laws, there was no right of action for alienation of a wife's affeclions." Id. 
82. Olsen, !IUpra note SS, at 1531; Paul Davis FinCher, Note. To Have a11d Nor Hold: 
Applying tM Disco•'O')' Rule to loss ofC01Uortium Claf,,,. Stemming from Prtmoritol, Lattnt 
ltrjurtts, S3 VAND. I.. R£v. 685, 692 (2000). Professor Frances Olsen has cb.aracmized this 
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passage of the acts required courts to do one of three things regarding 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation: hold that the husband's 
right to his wife's services was obsolete; hold that a wife had an equal right 
to the services of her husband; or ignore the historical basis of the rights of 
action and extend them to women "on the theory of equality."Sl Most states 
recognized a wife's right of action. 84 The Indiana Supreme Court, for 
example, reasoned that the common law did give wives a cause of action for 
alienation of affections, but, due to the legal fiction that the husband and 
wife were one, the wife was procedurally prevented from asserting the 
cause. ss The court insisted upon legal recognition of the cause of action of 
the wife: 
If there is any such thing as legal truth and legal right, a wronged 
wife may have her action in such a case as this, for in all the long 
category of human rights there is no clearer right than that of a 
wife to her husband's support, society, and affection. An invasion 
of that right is a flagrant wrong, and it would be a stinging and 
bitter reproach to the law if there were no remedy.86 
The reasoning of procedural incapacity was criticized by at least one 
commentator as being "incredible" because it ignored the fact that the basis 
for the Incapacity was the woman's inferiority. 87 That commentator 
described the theoretical basis for the extension as follows: "The historical 
basis of these actions-loss of services-has collapsed and a new one, 
violation of inherent marital rights, has been substituted."88 Thus, one 
could argue that, in Holmes' terms, alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation had embarked upon their new careers.89 
change in !he law as an attempt to make !he famil y  more like !he market. Although she 
evaluates the acts as undermining !he male-dominated hierarchy of the family, she also socs 
!hem as "detrimental to women," because they also undermined !be altruistic elhic of !he family 
and !bus left women open to the type of domination that prevails in the market. Olsen, supra 
note SS, at JS3J-32. 
83. Lippman, supra note 65, at 662. 
84. Brown, supra note 11, at 476 (stating that "overwhelming wcigJ11 of aulhority" 
recognized that Married Women's Propeny Acts removed a legal disability, thus giving women 
right to maintain a right of action for alienation of affection); Feinsinger, supra note 11, at 
992-93. See also Lippman, supra note 65, at 662-66. 
8S. Haynes v. Nowlin, 29 N.E. 389, 389-90 (Ind. 1891); see also Gray v. Gee, 39 T.L.R 
429, 431 (K.B. 1923) (recognizing that wife always had substantive right to consortium, but was 
prevented from bringing action by procedural disability prior to !he enactment of !he Married 
Women's Propeny Act of 1882). 
86. Haynes, 29 N.E. at 389. 
87. Lippman, supra note 65, at 664. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 672 ("[O)ur marital law is !he outcome of rules of contract combined with 
Christian ideology and modified by !he historical process which Judge Holmes describes."). 
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Some states, however, were reluctant to recognize such an action for 
women. The Minnesota court, for example, reasoned that the action should 
not be extended for several reasons: the principal reason for recognizing an 
action for men, the possibility of illegitimate offspring was not present for a 
wife; a wife suffers no disgrace when her husband commits adultery; and a 
woman who would be a defendant in a wife's action probably would not be 
the seducer. 90 The Wisconsin court refused to extend the action because it 
feared a great increase in such lawsuits if wives were permitted to sue. 
Moreover, the court reasoned, men, being men, involved in daily social 
intercourse, can be expected to give in to temptation occasionally, whereas 
women, who are busy with household chores, do not face such 
temptations.91 
C. Rejection 
Indiana became the first state to abolish legislatively alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation. 92 The Indiana act, entitled "An Act to 
promote public morals,"93 abolished all of the heart balm torts, including 
breach of a promise to marry and seduction of a female over the age of 
twenty-one. Notwithstanding the misogynistic rhetoric, such as references 
to "gold diggers," used to support anti-heart balm legislation, 94 many of the 
leaders of the efforts were women. 95 For example, the Indiana legislation 
was spearheaded by Roberta West Nicholson, the only female member of 
the Indiana legislature. 96 This period of time, the first "Sexual Revolution," 
90. Kroessin v. Keller, 62 N.W. 438, 438-39 (Minn. 1895). 
91. Duffies v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522, 525 (Wis. 1890). For a nearly contemptuous 
treatment of the Wisconsin court's reasoning, see Brown, supra note 11, at 477 ("To comment 
upon this alleged reasoning would be impossible without approaching contempt of court."). 
92. 1935 Ind. Acts, ch. 208 § 1 (codified at IND. CODE. ANN. § 2-508 (Bums 1946 
replacement volume)). 
93. Id. 
94. Larson, supra note 59, at 397; see also Coombs, supra note 59, at 12-17 (discussing 
the desire of feminists and womens' groups to abolish heart balm legislation). For writing of 
that time by a female academician, see Harriet Spiller Daggett, The Action for Breach of the 
Marriage Promise, in LEGAL ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 39, 92 (1935) (describing plaintiffs in 
majority of breach of promise actions as "unscrupulous women fortune hunters"). 
95. Coombs, supra note 59, at 12 (recounting that women sponsored the anti-heart balm 
bills in Indiana, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Ohio); Larson, supra note 59, at 397 n.93 
(discussing women's sponsorship of bills in Indiana, Maryland, and Nebraska). 
96. Aching Hearts Are Itching Palms, Says Woman Legislator as Men Gallantly Pass 
"Love Bill, " INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Feb. l ,  1935, at 1 [hereinafter Aching Hearts]. Mrs. 
Nicholson was a daughter-in-law of Meredith Nicholson, who was a famous Indiana writer and 
United States ambassador to Venezuela. Time magazine, reporting on Ms. Nicholson's 
legislative efforts in support of the legislation included a photograph of Ms. Nicholson reading 
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was marked by a reaction against the sexual repression of women and the 
Stereotyping of the ideal woman as sexually passive and modest. 97 Laws 
and symbols that fit with the Victorian ideal of women bad to go, as women 
struggled to assen their individuality and autonomy. 98 Thus, women argued 
against laws that gave them distinctive protections, asserting that they 
wanted 110 special rights and wanted to be treated in the same way as men. 
For example, speaking to the Indiana legislature in support of the first anti­
hcart balm bill, Roberta West Nicholson said, "Women do not demand 
rights, gentlemen, they cam them, and they ask no such privileges as these 
which arc aboli.shed in this bill."99 Illinois100 and New York101 also enacted 
anti-heart balm legislation in 1935. Although the anti-bean balm campaign 
got off to a fast start with twenty-three states considering bills in 1935, only 
eight states passed such legislation before 1950.101 In the 1970s, there was 
another wave of legislation and some court decisions abolishing criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections.10J 
Several points arc worth mentioning about the first wave of the anti-heart 
balm movement First, the withering academic criticism that set the stage 
for the legislative actions was directed at only one of the hean balm torts-­
that was breach of the promise to marry. 104 The banle cry1oi of the bean 
balm abolitionists in legislative halls and the media that fortune-seeking 
women were using hcart balm torts to blackmail men was primarily about 
real or fictional breach of ·promise plainriffs.106 Second, a point which 
IO her IWO children. Nallonal Afloln: Womtrt-Lhw v. Extortion, 1lME, Feb. 18, 1935, II 16. 
The Tim• anicle described her u, "handsome yoana Mts. Nicboboo, 1e11 years manied and 
molber of two." 
97. Lanon, "'f"O DOie S9, at 398-99. 
98. Id.; Coombs, supra note 59, at 14 ("ror femini51 women, I 111gccn, the (brucll of 
promise) cause of action was pem:ived u an icleological impedimau to woman's social 
progress . . . .  "); stt also Rebecca Tusbnet, Note, R.ula of Engagtm1nJ, 107 YALE L. J. 2583, 
2S87 (1998) ("Feminists also expressed coocern that the actions ensconced marriage u the 
epitome of 1 woman's cxistcnu and encouraged women 10 use lllC'D for ecooomic benefits 
ratbet lhan to mec1 lbem on equal 1erms."). 
99. Aching /{torts, supra OOIC 96, II I, 9. 
100. 193S m. Laws 716; ILL COMP. STAT. 40/1901-07 (193S). 
101. 1935 N.Y. Laws 263 (193S) (amending lbe CiYll Practice Act by ldding §§ 61-a to 
61-i.) 
102. Larson, SllJml DOie S9, at 396 n.92. 
103. M.B.W. Sinclair, Stdvctfon and the Myth of the ldtal ll'oman, S lAW & L'OEQ. J. 33, 
96-97 ( 1987). 
104. Larson, S11pra noie 59, a1 394 n.8S (citins anic:les). 
IOS. Professor Kane articulated ii IS the •l"P" "h's 1 mdcci." Kane, supra note 42, at 66. 
106. Id.; Coombs, supra note 59, al 12· 13. Professor Coombs tracq the image of the 
fommc-huntins woman to two popular women writen of the lime, Anill Loos, who wrote the 
best-seller Gendemen Pre/tr 8/0lldtJ, and Dorochy Dunbar Bromley. Id. Professor Larson 
desicn"bes lbe shift in public opinion IS follows: "In the early IWentieth centwy, the 
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intersects with the preceding point, the din about use of the heart balm torts 
for purposes of blackmail and extortion was not well substantiated. 107 Third, 
the academic writing of the time did not unifonnly praise the le�slative 
efforts to abolish criminal conversation and alienation of affections.1 
After the first wave of the 1930s, there was little critical re-examination 
of the movement to abolish criminal conversation and alienation of 
affections. A second wave of legislative enactments began in the 1970s. 109 
The movement again was buoyed by feminist successes and "the dramatic 
change in the conception of women" as autonomous, active individuals, 
who were not mere companions to men, and consequently easy victims. 1 10 
The reasons for abolition of the torts cited in the 1930s were recited again. 
Writing in 1972, a commentator stated that a "numerical majority of states" 
still recognized the tons. 1 1 1  A commentator writing nine years later stated 
that thirty states and the District of Columbia bad abolished or limited the 
action for alienation of affections, and twenty-two states and the District of 
Columbia had taken similar action regarding criminal conversation. 112 As 
discussed above, no more than nine states now recognize alienation of 
affections or criminal conversation. 113 In sbon, the movement to abolish 
criminal conversation and alienation of affections was not a great success in 
condcmnalion of mile sc�ual l&gre$Sion that had 1bapcd earlier public opinion began IO wane, 
and mile dcfcndanis were increasinaly perceived as innocent wgeis of schmllna and 
bypocntx:al blac\:niailcrs." Larson, S1l/Jl'O note 59, at 393. 
107. Feinsinger, svpra note 11, at 1008-09; Kmc, Sllpra note 42, at 6�7. 
108. E.g.: 
Tbm will be little ream at the pauing of the action for biucl! of promise tO 
many. But there is room for an honest difference of opinion as to the actions 
of alienation of affections and possibly of criminal converntion, which have 
long been sanctioned as indemnifying private injury, preserving the family 
unit and punishing public offctl$t& 
Fcinsinger, nipro note ll, at 1008; 
Wi1h all 1u fimlu, then, the action for alienation of affections is on the whole 
desirable, and while it should no doubt be aomcwhat limited, such limitations 
should I)()( be pcnni1ted to diminish the dc$irable effect which the possibility 
of lilbility in this ection now bas in di$couragjng the intentional breaking up 
of homes. 
Brown, supra note 11, at 506; see also !Une, .rupro note 42, at 65·72. 
109. Sinclair, supra note 103, at 97. 
1 10. Id.; I.anon, St<Pra l)(l(e 59, at 400. 
111. William M. Kelly, Note, � Case for Retmtion of Cawrs of AcJion for lntenlWnal 
/nteeference With 71te Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 426, 429 (1972). 
112. Kavanagh, supra note 26, at 330-31. 
113. S«supra�1. 
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the first wave. 1 14 The sustained effort, over a sixty-five year period, 
however, has been quite successful. 
D. After the Fall 
They just will not go away quietly. The abrogation of criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections in most states has not spelled the 
end of civil lawsuits based on adultery. Now the claims are pursued under 
collateral tort theories-most commonly intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 1 1 5 Some claims are pursued under the rubric of professional 
malpractice when the third-party paramour is a clergyman, 
1 1 6 lawyer, 
doctor, 1 1 7 etc. 
Another approach is that taken in Neal v. Neal. 1 1 8 The wife sued both 
her husband and his partner. The court announced that Idaho no longer 
recognized the theory of criminal conversation, but it struggled with the 
plaintiffs battery claim against her husband. The plaintiffs argument was 
that she had sexual relations with her husband not knowing that he had 
engaged in extramarital sex, and that had she known of his affair, she would 
not have consented to having sex with him. 1 1 9 Thus, the wife argued that 
sexual relations with her husband was an offensive contact, and her consent 
was ineffective because it was obtained by fraud-the husband's failure to 
disclose a material fact. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of 
the battery claim, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact on 
the issue of consent. 120 
In South Carolina, which legislatively abolished both criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections, a husband joined his wife's 
paramour as a partner in his divorce action on the ground of adultery. 121 
The family court held the wife's lover jointly and severally liable for the 
husband's attorney fees. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the 
1 1 4. Larson, supra note 59, at 396 n.92 (describing the anti-heart balm movement as "by no 
means uniformly successful" before 1950). 
1 1 5. See, e.g., Osborne v. Payne, 3 1  S.W.3d 91 1 (Ky. 2000) (former husband bringing 
action against priest to whom husband and wife went for counseling); Scamardo v. Dunaway, 
694 So. 2d 1 041  (La. Ct. App. 1 997) (husband suing doctor who was treating his wife); Quinn 
v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (alleging that defendant engaged in open and 
notorious affair with plaintiffs wife with intent to injure plaintiff). 
1 1 6. See, e.g. , Cherepski v. Walker, S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1996); Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 
1 121  (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
1 1 7. See, e.g. , Nicholson v. Han, 1 62 N.W.2d 3 1 3  (Mich. Ct. App. 1968). 
1 1 8. 873 P.2d 8 7 1 (Idaho 1994). 
1 1 9. Id. at 876. 
120. Id. at 877. 
1 2 1 .  Heape v. Heape, 5 1 7 S.E.2d 1, 1-3 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
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family court's  decision was tantamount to a "quasi-revival of the torts of 
criminal conversation and alienation of affection." 122 
Courts want the claims to go away, and they often dismiss them as 
repackaged versions of criminal conversation or alienation of affections, 
which have been legislatively abolished. 123 For example, a Massachusetts 
appellate court rejected a claim that a defendant' s  engaging in an adulterous 
affair with plaintiffs wife that allegedly became known to plaintiff, his son, 
and the community at large constituted intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.124 The court stated as follows: "An affair of the sort alleged here 
would by most in our society be considered reprehensible and a cause for 
sadness, anger and distress; we do not condone the behavior which is 
alleged . . . .  "125 The court then went on to say, however, that such conduct 
is not outrageous and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. 126 
The obstinance and tenacity of plaintiffs in bringing these lawsuits, 
notwithstanding the general abrogation of criminal conversation and 
alienation of affections, is instructive in considering the role of tort law. 
Plaintiffs are being injured, and they want to pursue a legal remedy. If tort 
law does not provide a means of civil redress, it is incumbent on members 
of the legal profession to articulate cogent reasons for the decision. I do not 
think most of the reasons articulated thus far are adequate to deny relief for 
so great a harm and so great a wrong. 127 
122. Id. at 3 .  
123. See, e.g., Quinn v .  Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 333 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Nicholson v. 
Han, 162 N. W.2d 3 1 3 ,  3 1 7  {Mich. Ct App. 1968). In a California case, a former husband sued 
his former wife for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the following facts: during 
marriage, wife had extramarital relationship out of which daughter was born, but wife did not 
tell husband that daughter was not his biological child until dissolution of marriage when 
husband sought custody of daughter. Steve H. v. Wendy S., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 9 1 -92 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997). The appellate court held that permitting an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim on these facts would contravene the policy underlying California's abolition of 
the heart balm torts. Id. at 95-96. 
1 24. Quinn, 732 N.E.2d at 330. 
125. Id. at 3 39. 
126
. Id. 
1 27.  One of the most eloquent statements of this concern is in a leading treatise on tort law 
by Professors Harper, James, and Gray, in which they question the wisdom of complete 
abrogation of the torts: 
Undoubtedly the actions in question have been subjected to abuses. What is 
doubtful, however, is the wisdom of meeting such abuses by complete 
abolition of all remedies . . . .  It may well be that limitation on damages and 
certain procedural reforms would have met the problem more satisfactorily 
than complete abolition. Particularly in the case of alienation, grievous 
wrongs are suffered and some of life's most important interests ruthlessly 
invaded. To abolish all remedy in such cases is certainly subject to serious 
question. 
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Ill. CRITIQUE OF REASONS GIVEN FOR ABOLISHING CRJMINAL 
CONVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS 
It is possible, and perhaps even to be expected, that the reasons given for 
abrogating these two tort theories would change over a sixty-five year 
period. Yet, the reasons given by commentators, courts, and legislators 
have remained largely the same. 128 
A. The Great Potential for Abuse/Extortion 
These torts are particularly susceptible to the abuse of extortion and 
blackmail. This is the grandparent of all the reasons-the one that was 
given in support of the initial legislative efforts.129 First, as discussed 
above, tbe theory of recovery for which abolitionists cited this reason was 
breach of aiJ'romise to marry, not criminal conversation or alienation of 
affections. 1 Notwithstanding that fact, it was and, remarkably, still is 
given as a reason for abrogating alienation and criminal conversation. 131 
There were in the early 1900s newspaper accounts and a few cases 
mentioning breach of promise actions that were described as blackmail.132 
One writer, however, characterized those depictions as being driven by 
"misogynistic backlash" to the Sexual Revolution, based on a fear of 
women's newfound assertiveness. 133 R�ardless of the reason for the 
"blackmail" scare, modem commentators 1 as well as commentators in the 
t930s135 have observed that there was no effort to substantiate the 
disproportionate use of the heart balm torts, in comparison with other tort 
theories, for purposes of extortion. One commentator writing in the 1930s 
argued that there were other rights of action which were at least as 
HARrER ET Al., supra note 8, al 534-35. 
128. For other critiques of the reasons, see Kelly, supra note 111, at 429-33, and Jones, 
supra note 40, at 71-84. Some of my critique repeals some of theirs. 
129. See supra note 106 and accompanying lext. 
130. See supra notes I04-I08 and accompanying text. 
I3I. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 87I, 875 (Idaho 1994). 
I32. Coombs, supra note 59, al I5-16. 
I33. Larson, supra note 59, al 398-99. 
I34. Larson, supra note 59, at 395 n.91; Jones, supra note 40, al 73-74; Kelly, supra !lOle 
I II, at 430. 
I35. Feinsinger, supra note 11, at I008-09 (stating that "newspaper emphasis has created 
an illusion of universality as to the evils of unfounded actions, coercive settlements or excessi,•e 
verdicts"); Kane, supra note 42, at 66 ("[f)bere was some justification for the resentment over 
the abuse of . . .  breach of promise to many, but we may seriously doubt whether these abuses 
were as universal or as ineradicable as to necessitate the wholesale abolition of established 
rights and remedies."). 
U:0985] TWO OLD TORTS LOOKING FOR A NEW CAREER 10 13  
HUsceptible of abuse as the heart balm torts . 136 In the end, the most that can 
he said in support of this reason is that one may intuitively think that it is 
true because of the great embarrassment that may be associated with sexual 
misconduct and the publicity that such conduct will generate. 137 Given the 
prevalence of adultery in contemporary society, however, it is fair to 
ttuestion whether a potential defendant would fear the stigma and 
ostracization that may have resulted during an earlier period. In summary, 
this is a reason for not recognizing alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation that was dubious when given in the 1930s and is wholly 
incredible now. 
B. Archaic Torts Because They Treat Married Women As 
Property of Their Husbands 
Criminal conversation and alienation of affections should be abandoned 
because they are based on the archaic notion that a husband has a property 
interest in his wife. This reason is often articulated by courts 138 and 
commentators. 139 It certainly has a basis in history. 140 The dramatic 
expansion of the third-party interference torts in 1 853 in Lumley v. Gye has 
been explained as the creation of a new type of property--contract rights. 141 
Before that general recognition of interference torts, the property interest of 
the plaintiff was grounded in the status relationship rather than the 
contractual rights. 142 One response to this is to argue that although the 
historical basis of the torts was the proprietary interest of the husband in his 
wife's body and services, this basis was purged when the rights of action 
were extended to women. Professor Chamallas notes that when loss of 
consortium claims were extended to women, they lost their property-like 
features, and in their new sentimental and nonproprietary form, they lost 
their favored status among torts . 143 It is tempting to argue that, like loss of 
consortium claims, criminal conversation and alienation of . affections lost 
their property basis when the rights of action were extended to women. 
But, the argument goes too far. There is still a property element to the 
136. Kane, supra note 42, at 67. 
137. Larson, supra note 59, at 395 n.91. 
138. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994). 
139. Chamallas, supra note 5, at 341 (rejecting the torts in which "the wife is treated as the 
property of the husband and the marriage is organized primarily to serve the husband's sexual 
and emotional needs"); McDouga� supra note 32, at 181. 
140. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
141. Note, supra note 73, at 1520. 
142. Id. 
143. Chamallas, supra note 48, at 528. 
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torts. 144 Indeed, one .commentator .argued that criminal conversation and 
alienation .of affections are property-based ,because · changes in the 
relationship do not alter the rights; thus, he argued, the result of the Married 
Women's Property Acts should have been extinction of the torts rather than 
their extension to women. 14� There are property aspects of the torts even in 
their current gender-neutral iterations: they do · tend to infringe on the 
autonomy of a spouse who chooses to commit adultery, and they require 
third parties to respect the right to exclusiye sexual relations-part of the 
rights that "run" with tqe relationship� 
It must be admitted that there still are property characteristics . of the 
torts. Nonetheless, it is not clear why the mutual property interests in 
relationships are as offensive as the former unilateral property interest in 
body and services. Property in the feudal sense of ownership of tangibles is 
not acceptable to desctjbe relationships between people; · property in that 
' sense is far too limited for modem society. 146 . Such "new property" rights 
based on relationships have not been considered as odious when applied to 
people as the old property rights based on absolute ownership. 147 For 
example, the plaintiff in a recent case sought to replace the property-based 
rationale for criminal conversation with a marital . obligation of fidelity that 
was recognized.by the domestic relations title of the Idaho Code. 148 Indeed,. 
at least one comment.a.tor has called for a reconception of autonomy, so 
valued by feminists, that rejects individualism and property and stresses the 
importance of collectivis111 and rela#onships. 149 
144. Dobbs, supra note 24, at '354-55 (describing legal status which the whole· world must 
recognize as a form of property). 
145. Lippman, supra note 65, at 659. 
146. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also MARY ANN 
GLENDON, Tu:E NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); Laura s. Underkuftler, On 
Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990). 
147. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal 
Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911 ,  947 (1989). 
A more communitarian social vision of property rights would start from the 
assumption that property rights are almost always shared, rather than unitary, 
and that they ordinarily are created in the context of relationships. This is 
true in th� most important areas of social life, including the family, the 
workplace, and housing. · 
Id. ; see also Green, Relational Interests, supra note 49, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 462 (distinguishing 
relational interests from property). 
148. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994) (citing IDAHO CODE § 32·901). The 
Idaho Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument, reasoning that divorce is the exclusive 
remedy for the breach of any duty imposed by that code section. Id. 
149. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989). 
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To 'State the argument as a call for abolition o f  the torts based on their 
historical roots is not to give it its full force. One of the commentators 
writing about the torts at the time of the first abolition movement effectively 
refuted that version of the argument: 
It is also urged that a consideration of the history of the action 
shows that it has no proper place in our modem law . . . .  It is . . . 
argued that the wife's emancipation, which takes away the original 
basis for both of these actions, should have resulted in their total 
abolition. But this is an obvious non sequitur sirice the abolition 
of the original basis for the action does not necessarily prove that 
it has not still justification under modem conditions. 150 
Professor Brown, after rejecting the archaic basis argument, went on to 
conclude that alienation of affections, despite faults and the need for 
limitations, was still "on the whole desirable" for its effect of "discouraging 
the intentional breaking up of homes." 151 · 
Like Professor Brown, I reject the historical basis as an argument for 
abolishing criminal conversation and alienation of affections. I do, 
however, recognize that there is still a property basis inherent in the torts, 
and this merits examination. There are reciprocal property interests arising 
out of the marital relationship. Some will consider this "new" property a 
good thing. Others, including many feminists, will consider it bad and 
argue that it still poses greater dangers to women than men. Women's 
autonomy regarding their bodies, · including sexual and reproductive rights, 
historically has been precarious, and remains controversial. Consequently, I 
think it is more threatening for the law to say to a woman that she is limited 
in a decision regarding sexual relations. 152 Much of this was probably 
embodied in the words of Roberta West Nicholson when she said, "Women 
do not demand rights, gentlemen, they earn them, and they ask no such 
privileges as these which are abolished in this bill."153 Although reasonable 
people can disagree about how harmful to women are these property rights, 
I argue that, on balance, the good for women and · society outweighs the 
150. Brown, supra note 1 1 ,  at 505; see also Norton v. Macfarlane, 8 1 8  P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 
1991) (stating that obsolete procedural and property theories once associated with alienation of 
affections are uniformly rejected, but that does not mean tort is no longer useful). 
1 5 1 .  Brown, supra note 1 1 , at 506; see also Kelly, supra note 1 1 1 , at 43 1 ("Even though 
the actions were originally designed to protect a fictive right and reflected a now-antiquated 
view of the relation between the sexes, they have in the modem era taken on a very different 
and worthwhile function-that of providing a remedy for injuries of a highly sensitive nature 
while discouraging intentional disruptions of families."). 
152. For an excellent discussion of feminist criticism of commodification of sex, see 
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCl10N TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 230-36 (1 999). 
153. Aching Hearts, supra note 96. 
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harm to women from restricting their autonomy. First, although significant 
progress bas been made toward economic equality between men and 
women, it is still true that many manied women are, to a large extent, 
financially dependent on their husbands. is.i Moreover, marital instability 
and divorce in many cases have a "more pronounced social and emotional 
impact on women than on men";us that is, middle-aged divorced men are 
regarded more positively than are middle-aged divorced women, and the 
market for sexual liaisons is better for the men. Thus, I think women may 
derive substantial benefit from a relational interest in marriage that carries 
duties that must be respected by everyone. Second, I think that society 
benefits from marriages that have duties of exclusive sexual relations, and a 
communitarian perspective might require men and women to make some 
sacrifices of individual autonomy for the good of society. 156 
C. Potential Tort Liability's Nondeterrence of Extramarital Relations 
A classic statement of this reason for abolishing the torts was given by 
the Idaho Supreme Court: "Deterrence is not achieved; the nature of the 
activities . . .  that is sexual activity, arc not such that the risk of damages 
would likely be a deterrent." 157 This is a matter of opinion, and there is no 
empirical evidence to support it. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the suivey 
instrument and the polling techniques that would substantiate or refute this 
speculation. 151 While I join Professor Carrington in claiming no expertise 
on the subject of sex, u9 I th.ink it is an equally plausible hypothesis that the 
154. Lenore J. Wcittman, 11re &:onom/cs o/Dlvorot: Social & Economic Constt1ut'nces of 
Property. Alimony & Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1241-63 (1981). 
155. Olsen, supra no1e SS, a1 l 53S. 
156. "Communiwiw believe thar oven . . .  in a rights-conscious society, rights have 
limits, and involve concomiwit responsibilities . . . .  (They) suggested an agenda ro advance 
commonly held social val\IC$ without unduly compromising individual righls." Ackt'rlllan, 
supra note 47, at 6SO. Like Professor Ackerman, I am not a card-carrying communitarian, if 
then: is such a card. Id. at 652 n.11, 6S4 n.29. I do think, however, that an appioach that 
recognizes some limirations on individual righ1s and autonomy for the good of society is, or 
should be, an in1egral pan of relational tort theory. Ste generally William J. Woodward, Jr., 
Contrac1arians, Comm1111lty, and tire Tort of Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1103 
(1996) (discussina the comm11nillWian approach to the "'lational tort of interference with 
contract). Some feminist writers also have embraced a communirarian approach. See generally 
Ncdelsky. supra note 149 (discussing communitarian reconceplUA!ization of autonomy and 
contrastina that with liberalism's concept ofauronomy). 
157. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994); see also Newton v. Hardy, 149 L.T .R. 
165 (K.B. 1933) (slating that people merely "drift into a siruation" withoul considering the legal 
implications). 
158. See Jones, supra note 40, at 84 n.176. 
159. Carringron, supra note 60, al 859. 
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prospect of tort liability could dampen the fires of sexual passion. 160 
Because the financial liability will be placed on the outsider, the deterrent 
effect would be achieved by making the outsider less interested in the 
married person, not vice versa. Given that the outsider is likely to have 
other options that do not carry all the risks associated with the married 
person, the additional risk of financial liability may deter the outsider. 
Explaining another interference with relation tort, interference with 
contractual relations in the context of employment contracts, Professor 
Wonnell states d1at the objective of the tort is not to prevent the employees 
from breaching their contracts, but instead to deter third parties from 
interfering; that is, lhe potential tort liability decreases the value to the 
prospective em�loyer (potential interfering th.ird party) of the employee 
under contract. 1 Thus, lhe tort of intentional interference wilh marriage 
would help narrow the market for the spouse considering extramarital 
relations. 
While I do not argue !hat deterrence of interference is a sufficient ground 
for the torts, that speculative effect seems to me as likely as the converse. 
D. The Uiw Should Not Attempt to "Legislate" Morality 
Occasionally, a critic will say that the law should not attempt to legislate 
morality. 162 This reason merits little attention. As one commentator has 
stated, ''(�t is absurd to suggest that th.e law bears no relationship to 
morality." 61 Law will deal with issues of morality, but not eveey moral 
standard or judgment will be translated into law.16' 
The criticism about legislating morality may harbor a narrower objection 
that the law seldom should restrict the consensual sexual activities of 
adults. 165 Perhaps that was the view of the attorney who disdainfully 
reacted to the Hutelmyer case on a television show: "Family values, this is 
160. Id. at 887 ("How sexually attractive, the Tory wonders, would be an available pannct 
whose embrace was accompanied by a wage and bank llCCOUllt gamWuncntT'). 
161. Christopher T. Wonnell, 111• Conrracrua/ Disempowennenr ofEmployus, 46 STAN. L 
REV. 87, 96 ( 1993). 
162. McDougal, supra noce 32, at 163. 
163. Ackennan, supra note 47, at 661. 
164. The classic example is whether law should impose a duty to r=ue. See generally 
Heyman, supra note 47. 
I 6S. Michael E. Malamut, Proposal for Re>uion of Archaic Statutes Implicating Private 
Consensual Noncommercial Adult Sexual Conducr, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 4S, 66 (1993) 
(discussing criminal law, says "laws agains1 fornication and adultcty ""' primarily aimed at 
preserving a moral order in which maniage is the only appropriate relatiomhlp for sexual 
expression"). 
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really absurd, I mean, if it was the law of New York, could �ou imagine? 
This whole city would be, like, at the courthouse all the time." 66 
Law, throughout history, has regulated sexual conduct. 167 This should 
not be surprising in view of the fact that sexual mores are pivotal to our 
society and community. 168 Moreover, as Professor Carrington points out, 
sexual conduct has as much effect on nonpartici�ts, often including 
children, and society as do employment relations. 69 Given that sexual 
conduct has often pronounced effects on others and on society, it is not 
surprising that the law will regulate it. The law also will leave some aspects 
of sexual conduct unregulated. Thus, the issue to be debated is not whether 
law will regulate sexual conduct, but how law will regulate it. 
E. /nta11gible and Speculative Damages that are Subject to Prejudice/ 
Unseemliness of Trying to Ass11age Lost Love With Money 
While this argument may have had some appeal in the 1930s, the 
development and expansion oftort law make this argument anachronistic. 110 
Damages for emotional distress arc recognized both as parasitic damages 
and as stand-alone damages.171 Recovery is permitted for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as well AS negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.172 The concerns with the special problems presented by emotional 
injuries, principally spurious claims, ultimately have not been found by 
courts an adequate reason to refuse to recognize the injuries and a right of 
recovery. m 
The argument that it denigrates the lofty emotions of love and affection 
to award monetary remedies for loss of those emotions is again an argument 
166. Jones, supra note 40, at 63 (quoting attorney who appeared on Rivera live (CNBC 
television broadcast, Aug. 11, 1997)). 
167. Su generally RlCllARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). Judge Posner describes 
public policy since lhe beginning of lhe Christian era as etfons to restrict sexual activity to 
malriagc, and he notes that most Americans subscribe to that ideal. Id. at 243. Su also 
CKA.\IALLAS, supra note 152, al 218 ("Despite its intimate cbam:ter, sexual conduct is highly 
"'gulated activity, and lhe laws governing sex have been an especially active site of struggle 
ovu the boundaly between acceptable and legally aanctionable conduct."). 
168. Carrington, supra note 60, at 903. 
169. Id. 
170. Kelly, supra note 111, at 432. 
171. Lcvi�supra note 48,at 140-46. 
172. Id. 
173. Cbamallas, supra note 48, at 496 (observing that even opponents of permitting 
recovery for emotional injuries "'cognizc wcalcncss of old arguments rcgardin& ease of 
p=ting fake claimJ and difficulty of causation); Levit, supra note 48, at 184-88 (diacussing 
studies subslantiating the reality and severity of emotional injuries). 
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whose time has pas$ed.174 The argument of feminists and other reformers 
was that love and marriage are not like market relations in which 
commodities are bought and sold; instead, the selfless emotion of love 
obviates the protections provided by legal regulations, which are needed in 
the commercial marketplace.17s The label "heart balm" was used during the 
first wave of legislative abrogation to satirize the notion that money 
damages could make the heart feel better.176 Today, it is common practice 
10 award money damages when a plaintiff bas suffered loss of love and 
affection. Indeed, Professor Chamallas has observed that a failure to award 
monetary damages for emotional harm disadvantages women and devalues 
the injuries that they suffer.177 
F. Attempt to Place Blame on A Third-Party When One or Both 
Spouses Often Are Primarily to Blame I Marriage Was Worth 
Very Little If It Could Be Broken Up 
These related arguments are encapsulated in a statement from an early 
critic: "(T]he action for alienation of affections, and to a considerable extent 
the action for criminal conversation proceed on the hypothesis of a perfectly 
harmonious husband-wife relationship destroyed or impaired by a 
malicious, scheming and seductive intruder."178 I see nothing about the tort 
theories that is based on such a presumption. Quite to the contrary, I think 
these torts are based on the presumption that marriages arc delicate 
relationships, which often teeter in the balance. It is often said that 
marriage is bard work. That belief recognizes that spouses have to deal 
with many matters that are not always fun, including balancing budgets, 
making decisions about children, caring for aging parents and in-laws, and 
so forth. A third person, who offers the fun and excitement of sexual 
relations unencumbered by these other weighty matters, might be an 
attractive diversion, or more. Or, as one commentator said, "even a 
relatively 'good' marriage may be susceptible to . . . a Don Juan."179 The 
torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affections declare providing 
such sexua.I relations out of bounds. 
174. Cbamallas, 1upra note 48, al 497 ("[ijl is 100 late 10 complain about such a basic 
fealU!e of the tons sySlem, unless one is prepared 10 do away with large areas of tort liability.''). 
175. Tushnc� supra note 98, at 2590. 
176. Note, supra notc 27, al 1771 n.4. 
177. Cbamallas, supra note 48, al 497; see also Larson, mpra note 59, at 448. 
178. Feinsingcr, supra note 11, at 995. 
179. Kelly,supro note l ll,at431. 
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Why, this argument queries, should a duly be imposed on a third person 
not to interfere if the spouse, who wishes to engage, consents? 1111 I think the 
answer should be that society values the relationship of marriage; society 
recognizes that because marriage is not always a blissful relationship, it is 
susceptible 10 outside interference; and finally, that because of these 
considerations, society imposes a duty on everyone to avoid interfering with 
marriages, at least by means of engaging in sexual relations with a married person. 111 This is the reason that I would recognize fault on the pan of the 
third party who has sexual relations with a married persoo.112 In a society 
that purpons 10 value relationships, panicularly marriages and family 
relationships, and a tort law regime that has recognized expansive and 
expanding duties to avoid injuring others, I think a duty should be 
recognized not to interfere in an existing marriage. In my view, such 
conduct is blameworthy. 
This argument against the torts also is based on the idea that there arc 
difficult causation and allocation of fault issues that the law should not 
address. The causation argument usually suggests that the participatin§ 
spouse has a free will that is nOI overborne by the acts of the third party. 1 
In ton terminology and theory, this is an argument about superseding 
cause.11' Superseding cause has fallen into some disfavor among some 
modem torts scholars under the rationale that it is inconsistent with a 
comparative fault regime. 115 Superseding cause analysis is particularly 
180. Stt, tg., �. rllfll'O note 7, 11 1248 (''These tO<IS could also opente unjustly by 
punishing the d<fcndant for conduct to which bolh panicipanta conscnL "). 
181. Kelly, supra note 111, 11 431 (siating lha1 this azauma>t opinst the tons focuses on 
pcnonality of plaintiff spouse and cJc.empbasazcs maliciousness of intcrloi>«'• "assault upon 
the mamaae"). 
182. I lhlnk Professor Anita Bcmstein for her cballenaing argument Iha� although lhc 
unfaithful spouse may have cngagcd in blameworthy conduct, lhe lhird party bas not. I disagree 
wilh that "llWll<"� but 1 apimclate the f'ac1 that one who acccptS it will disagice with 
recoanition of a IOrt of intentional intcifermce with marriage. 
183. Sn Note, supra note 73, at 1518-20. lo lhc Englub action IO mtO\'Cf dama,es for 
third-party cnllcement of a servant, it was unnecessary to prove that the servant's will bad bttn 
overcome by lhc lets of the third-party interferer. Id. 11 1520. 'The rationale was that the 
SCIV&OI bad no fl<IC will Id. II 1526. 
184. 'The problem was addressed in English law in 1881 in Bowen v. Hal� 6 Q.BD. 333 
( 1881). The COUii kVcred the intcrfctenee ,.;th contnct ton from its mixed lu$toric:al rootS. 
wlucb included lhc action of enticement (that inclllclcd the rule of int<n-eruna Will). 'The COUii 
limited cntic:emcnt actions IO lllOIW SCMUllS, and it announced lhat ocher intCJftJCOCCS wtn: 
actionable if etfec1ed by a "malicious acltt Note, rupra no1e 73, at 1527; , .. also Marie P. 
Gergen, Torrious lnterfer�n«: How /1 Is Englllfing Commercial Law. W1iy This Is Nol Emirely 
Bad. and a PnMlmtlal Rupon#, 38 AlUZ. L REV. 1175, 1204 (1996) (discussin& Bowm). 
185. S« Terry Christlieb, Note. W1iy Suptrttding C0Jae Analysis Sliovld Ik AbtzndtlMd, 
72 TeX. L REY. 161 (1993); I« also Ooees, rupro Dote 7, at 461 (explaining that stat=cnts 
about intervening and supmccling causes express conclusions. but they add a layer of C011fu:sion 
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objectionable when the harm that occurs was within the scope of 
foreseeable risks created by the defendant's conduct. 116 In human 
behavioral tenns, this is an argument about free will and autonomy. 187 
Again, this is a situation in which it is too late in the day for tort law to 
refuse to redress injuries because of such difficulties. Consider, for 
example the various causation standards that have been developed in tort 
law and beyond, including the lost chance of survival theory in wrongful 
death cases. ia Furthennore, comparative fault has become prevalent in 
modern tort law, often crossing the chimerical boundary between 
negligence and intentional torts. That said, however, I do not see difficult 
causation questions necessarily arising in all criminal conversation and 
alienation of affections cases. The blamewortl1y conduct does cause 
damages, whether it breaks up a marriage or not. 119 A spouse's expectation 
of sexual fidelity within marriage has been destroyed, and regardless of 
whether the marriage is destroyed, tbat is an emotional harm directly 
traceable to the acts of the interloper. In cases in which the plaintiff claims 
that the interloper destroyed the marriage, the causation and degree of fault 
issues are no more difficult than many other types of tort cases, and they 
can be addressed through various causation standards (perhaps including 
lost chance of survival). a.nd if a court: so chooses, allocation of fault. 
ln the end, this argument strikes me as specious. ln the difficult 
causation and allocation of fault issues they may present, these torts are no 
different from many others that modem tort law does recognize. The 
solicitude regarding the tortfeasor being blamed for breaking up a marriage 
that may already have been tr0ubled is enigmatie.190 Of course adultery 
damages most marriages; indeed, some unknowable percentage of 
.-ther than providing guidance regarding liability); RICHARD A El'sTEIN, ToRTS, § 10.12, 81 
269 ( 1999) (recognizing that limitations of liability based on "causal intervention" have been 
"widely criticized''); cf Kelsey L Joyce Hooke, Note, Col lision at�: Tlte /�I/ability of 
the S�edirig Couse and Pure Comparatltoe Pou/t Doctrines In Admiral/)'. 14 WASH. L Rev. 
1S9 (1999) (arguing that maintenance of superseding cause analysis is inconsist<:nl with die 
adoption of a pure comparative fault regime in admiralty law). 
186. Stt . ... g., Do8BS,mpt"a note 7, § 192; RfsTATEMENT, lllF" DOie 8, § 281 ant. b. 
187. Woodward, 11'pn> 001e 1S6, at 1120-22, 1122 n.68 (explaining lhat the caus.\tion issue 
is also an issue about autonomy). 
188. Ste, e.g . • Joseph ll King Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance In Personal Injury 
Tom lm'OMng l'rttXisitng Conditions and Fullill ConsrqutnCU, 90 YAJ..E. LJ. 1353 (1981). 
189. Cf Woodwanl, supra note I 56, at 1122-23 (discussing, both from individu.tlist and 
relational perspectives, the damage that an interferer causes in an interference with contract 
claim). 
190. As the Nebraska Supreme Court observed, 'la) oaniage teetering on the brink of 
domestic disaster should nevertheless be spa� a shove over the precipice." Creason v. Myers, 
3SO N.W.2d 526, 528 (Neb. 1984). 
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marriages do not survive discovered adultery. Why arc we worried about 
the interloper being unfairly punished? 
G. Improper Motivation of Revenge as lmpellls for Bringing the Action 
Some couns and commentators have stated that vindictiveness or a 
desite to exact revenge are often strong motivations for suing for criminal 
conversation or alienation of affections, and such motivations have no place 
in ton Jaw.191 The Idaho Supreme Court said, "Revenge, which may be a 
motive for bringing the cause of action, has no place in determining the 
legal rights between two parties. "192 I disagree. I think that one of the 
principal reasons I sue someone for hitting me on the nose is that I want 
revenge for his violation of a right of mine. That motivation is not a good 
reason to abolish the ton of battery. Indeed, some theorize that the revenge 
motivation is a basis on which all of ton law rests.193 So, I am willing to 
concede that revenge is a powerful, and indeed usually the most powerful, 
motivation for most criminal conversation and alienation of affections 
actions. lf the right of action is denied, then the revenge may find some 
other outlet. One possibility is a "blood feud."1" There are, of course, 
other, more civilized, avenues for exacting revenge, such as going on 11 
television show and discussing how one was wronged by an adulterous 
spouse and partner, and perhaps even fighting on that show}" My guess is 
that most readers who place themselves in the hypothetical at the beginning 
t 91. Dooos, supra � 7, at 1247 (slating tha1 some couru and legisla!U.re• !bat have 
abolished the tons have been moved in part by the conclusion tha1 plaintiffs are motivated by 
\indictivcoeS! and a desire IO inflid balm). 
192. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho t994). 
193. Benjamin C. Zlpursky, Rigltts, Wl'Oflg,t, a,,,/ Recoune In dre Law of Tons, SI VAND. 
L REV. I, 100 (1998) (positin& a civil rtcoune theory of ion law under which ion law is lbout 
what the state gives IO those whose rigJ\IS have been violated in place of the riah• 10 get cvco). 
Cf. Wallet H. Beekham, Jr. Cl al., TOWARDS ... JURISPRUD!lNCE Of INJURY: 'lllE CONTINUINO 
CREATION OF A SYS!D1 OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, R.El'oRT TO THE 
AMERCIAN BAR ASS'N 4-170 10 4-173 (1984) [hcttinafter TOWARDS A J�llOO'lcr). The 
cownillCC discussed the ippropriateocss of punishment Incl rctnl>ution and concluded tbal 
punisluncn1 plays a uscfW oullc:1 for the community scose of justice. Id. 11 4-172. 
194. Zipursky. n.prv DOlC 193, at 83. 
195. A mOIC crea1ivc Incl effective response may be lhal of lhc wife of a politician who 
became the campaign chailpcrsoo of her cstn1ngcd husband's opponent and offered details of 
her husband's unfallhfulncu in campaip messages. Rtp0rtwly Unfaithful Lawmaker's 
Gr«Jtest F« is W'lfe, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge). Aug. ll, 2000, at llA. A more 1tavistic 
response is illustrated by Wood v. °"'""' Enters., Inc., m which the husband conlionred the 
paramour Incl beat him wilh 1 pipe. In the battciy clam, lhc court rejected the dcfcmes or 
essmnptioo r the ri$k Incl unclean hands. No. 2000441, 200 I Ala. Civ. App. L£}CIS 498, at • 1. 
(Ala. Civ. App. Aug. 17, 2001). 
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of this article wanted revenge on the Wlfaithful spouse's partner. That 
seems to me a good reason for tort law to provide recourse rather than a 
good reason to deny a right of action. Moreover, the loss of a sense of 
retribution may lead to a loss of a sense of wrong. 196 
H. interference Torts ' Dele"ence of a Variety of Types of 
Conduct, /11c/uding Mere Persuasion 
Professor Dobbs identifies one of the most disturbing characteristics of 
au of the interference torts: they punish a broad range of conduct which can 
be the means of accomplishing the interference, including mere persuasion 
by speech. 197 This is what I consider the most effective criticism of 
interference torts generally, and alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation specifically. It is not, however, a concern that is unique to 
these tort theorics.198 !Defamation and invasion of privacy arc two well­
established tort theories that often limit speech and other expression. First 
amendment concerns have added constitutional modifications to those tort 
theories. 
As Professor Dobbs points out, alienation of affections covers family 
members who use speech to try to persuade another family member to leave 
a spouse. It also could cover a friend who tries to persuade one spouse to 
leave an abusive relationship. It could cover a potential paramour who 
encourages one to leave a spouse so that they could have a sexual 
relationship. It could cover use of "telephone sex," "chat rooms," and 
"cybersex" to interfere in a marriage.'99 I think Professor Dobbs is right 
that this tort potentially goes too far in punishing too much conduct. As 
with other interference torts, it becomes necessary to define what constitutes 
an improper means to accomplish the interference. As I discuss further 
below,200 I favor a narrower intentional interference with marriage tort that 
196. Speaking of the role ofretributlcn in criminal law, an English lepl scholar expressed 
this view well: "Without a sense of rctribu1ion we may lose our sense of wrong. Rl:tribution in 
punishment is an expression of lhe cooununity'1 disapproval of crime, and if this retribution is 
not given rceogllition the disapproval may also disappear." TOWARDS A JUIUSl'RUDENCE, S1lf"O 
note 193, § 4-175 (quoting A. 000DHART, ENGLISH !AW ANDTIIEMORALIAW 92-93 (1953)). 
197. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 361-63. 
198. I thanlc Professor David Robc1lsoo for assuaging my concerns regarding this criticism 
of criminal conversation and alienation of affections. 
199. See Bartie Lancas1u, Latest Trend in Marital Problems: Internet Adultery, at 
http://www.nandotimes.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2001); Jennifer Haiper, Sin Exists In 
Cyberspace, Priest Dlllaru C>n·Unt Adu/toy Jlirtually as Immoral?, WASH. Tu!Es, June 8, 
2000, at A3; Sandy Lawrence Ediy, A Jlirtual Statt of Af airs: A Bttttr ll'ay to Chtat: Ont KW 
uads to the Next and She Finds Herself at the Hilton, NAT0L POST, Dec. 9, 2000, at BO t. 
200. See infra notes 359-65 and accompanying texL 
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limits the improper means to engaging in sexual activity with a married 
person. As we have been reminded in recent times, what constitutes 
engaging in sex may vary from one person• s definition to another's. Ml 
Most cases will not raise that issue, and those that do can be addressed, 
perhaps by leaving what constitutes having sex to the jury. 
IV. l.aOAL AND CULTURAL CoNDITIONS CONTRJBl!T'TNO TO THE DEMISE Of 
CRIMINAL CoNVERSA TION AND ALIENATION OF AFFECflONS 
A. Evolving Tort Law: Some Torts Are More Equal Than Others 
The twentieth century was a period of rapid expansion in American tort 
law with recognition of new torts, new elements of damages, and new 
duties. New torts have included invasion of privacy, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and wrongful tennination in violation of public 
policy. 202 New damages have been recognized in many contexts, includi� 
emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and lost chance of survival. 
Duties recognized under the ·theory of negligence have expanded 
substantially, including duties to rescue and to protect against third-party 
criminal activity. Indeed, the histo� of tort law over the last century can be 
summarized in a wo�xpansion. Of course there have been periods of 
time and areas of tort law in which contraction rather than expansion 
occurred. In the midst of the general e�ansion, the heart balm torts stand 
out as a rare instance of contraction. Although candidates for new 
torthood often do have to be pushed hard for recognition, and some fail,206 it 
201. Consider, for eumple, President Clinton's speech in which he proclaimed that be "did 
not have sexual relations with thal womanO, Miss Lewinsky." Jenoifer 0. Hickey, Nation: The 
uwinsky Scandal, !NSIOHT MAOAZINI:, Jan. 4, 1999, al 14. Also, rccenl reports indicate that 
1eenagon do DOI consider engaging in oral sex u "having sex." Karen S. Peterson, Tttnagers 
Define "Having Sex" Differently, CH!cAOO SUN-1lMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at 31; see also Pamela 
JohMon, Are You Cheating?, BsENCE, Jan. 1, 2001, at 103 (discussing whether emotional 
attachments to noospouscs constinue marital infidelity). 
202. See genero//y Bernstein, supra no1e 45 (discussing characteristics of successful new 
tons). 
203. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort R.efomi: Gender 
Injustice In Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. I, 19-20 (I99S) (discussing twentieth cenrury 
expansion of ton law to recognize emotional, dignitary, and relational banns). 
204. Dowling, supra note 46, at 488 (discussing general expansion of ton law in twentieth 
cenrury). 
20S. Id. at 489 (calling heart balm legislation "probably the best modem example of 
restricting ton liability''). 
206. Bernstein, supra note 4S, at I S44. 
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is a bizarre occurrence for established torts with pedigrees to be abrogated. 
What aspects of tort law help explain this demise? 
I. The Less Than Spectacular ruse of the Ethereal Torts 
Since the early twentieth century, there has been a movement in 
American tort law to loosen it from its moorings in recognizing recovery for 
only injury to physical person and property. One strand of this development 
has been recognition of emotional or mental injuries. Although mental 
distress could be recovered as an element of parasitic damages before this 
movement, 207 the courts were reluctant to permit recovery when the only 
injury suffered was emotional.206 The other strand was recognition of 
injuries to relationships. Until Professor Leon Green began championing 
the cause of relational injuries in the 1930s, 209 American tort law paid little 
attention to such injuries as a distinct type of tort recovery. Professor Lev it 
combined these two strands of development in the term "ethereal torts. "210 
The evolution of tort law in this century has seen the growing 
recognition of tort recovery for bolh emotional injuries and relational 
injuries. In the area of emotional injuries, for example, all or a I most all 
jurisdictions now recopizc intentional infliction of emotional distress or 
the tort of outrage,21 which debuted in a 1948 Supplement to the 
Restatement (First) of Torts.212 Relational torts have not made a similar 
widely chronicled march toward acceptance for a couple of reasons. The 
first reason is that the category of relational torts does not have boundaries 
that are as distinct as those of the emotional distress torts: some torts are 
full-fledged members of the relational torts club while others have partial 
memberships. Second, most of the relational torts are not new; ralher, they 
have existed for centuries, but it is only in the last century that tihey have 
come to be considered as redressing injuries to relationships. 
The category of relational torts is amorphous, consisting of a few pure 
relational tort theories and many occasional relational tort theories. 
Defamation, 213 malicious prosecution, and invasion of privacy, for example, 
207. DOees, supra note 7, al 822; Levi!, supra noie 48, at 142. 
208. DOBBS, supra noie 7, al 822; Levit, supra no1e 48, at 142. 
209. See. e.g., Green, supra nole 49; lroN GREEN, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS 
(1940). 
2.10. Levit,supra nole 48. 
211. DOBBS, supra nole 7, al 826; Carl Tobias, Intentional Infliction of Mental Dlltress in 
Montana, 51 MONT. L. REv. 99 (1996). 
212. DOBBS, supra nole 7, at 825; Levi! supra note 48, al 142-43. 
213. Defamation comes close to being a pun: �tational ion. Professor GICCll obsctved !hat 
"file defamatory bann is by its very natun: most apposile 10 �lational intettslS." Green, supra 
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are not "pure" relational torts, but instead occasional relational torts; that is 
to say, these tort theories do not redress only injuries to relationships, 
although they may be employed in that context in an appropriate case. 
Perhaps the only pure relational tort ofrecent vintage is wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy. 21• Moreover, two of the emotional injury torts, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress are occasionally relational torts, often invoked in the 
context of relational injuries, but not applying exclusively in that context. 
The second reason for the quiet march of relational torts is that most of 
them have existed for a long time, but they were not, until the twentieth 
century, thought of as redressing relational injuries. Loss of consonium, a 
derivative tort claim, was recognized at common law in England. It was 
considered, however, as redressing an injury to property-in{ury to the 
bundle of consortium interests that a husband had in his wife. 15 Loosed 
from its property basis,216 loss of consortium has survived and even 
expanded, recognized in all jurisdictions for spomes, and recognized in 
some jurisdictions for loss of consortium of other family members, such as 
parents, children, siblings, and grandparents. 217 Alienation of affections and 
criminal conversation, like loss of consortium, were recognized as relational 
tons once the old property basis for the torts was undennined by the 
Married Women's Property Acts. 218 There is still some debate regarding 
whether interference with business interests is a property or relational 
tort. 219 
note 49. at 474. Tho injury on which the ton focl!KI is damage io reputation. Becaust 
reputation exisis .among communities and groups of people, defamation indirectly addresses 
relauonal injury. 
214. Ahhoug)l interference with business or contractual relations is a puR relational ton, it 
is nOI new. The seminal case recognizing the ton is Lumley v. Gye, 2 E&B 216, 22 LJ.Q.B. 
463 {1853). But it arguably traces back 10 founeenlh century England. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 
336. But su Gergen. supra note 184, at 1200 {discussing three theories regarding roots of the 
ton). According Co Professor Gergen, !he pre-history of the !Ort clepcnds on which of the three 
roois one selects. Id. at 1200-01 n.138. See also Nole, supra note 73, al 1510 (discumng the 
pre-Lumley an1eciodents of the ton). 
21 5. See supra notes 1 1·I3 and accompanying text. 
216. Lipprnan,supm note 65. at 653·54; Clwnallas, supra DOie 48, at 528. 
217. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3!0; Clwnallas, supra notc48, at S-02 & n.151, 514. 
218. O'Neil v. Schuekardt, 733 P.2d 693, 696 {Idaho 1986) (''The aclion for alienation of 
affections evolved from an action protecting propeny iniercsts to one protecting relational 
interests."). For criticism of the extension of the tons IO women once the propeny besis was 
eradicated, see LipptJWl, supra note 65, at 659. 
219. Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Hoimts on Efficient Breach and 
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2000) {oontrasting lhe property 
characterization of Epstein wilh the n:lational characterization of other commentators). 
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The expansion of the emotional and relational injury torts has not, 
despite much writing about them in scholarly journals, been an unqualified 
success story. 220 As recent commentators have noted, the torts redressing 
emotional and relational injuries are second-class citizens in the torts 
hierarchy. 221 Courts remain skeptical about many issues, including proof of 
the harm and the causal connection between the defendant's act and the 
harm. Consider for example, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional 
distreSS for injury to a third party-bystander recovery. In the prototypical 
case, a parent sues a defendant who, in the parent's presence, negligently 
physically injures the parent's child-defendant negligently drives a vehicle 
and strikes the child as the parent watches. m Most jurisdictions have 
recognized a right to recovery for bystander emotional distress,223 but they 
have struJ.glcd with the restrictions that should be placed on such 
recovery. 4 The uneasiness of courts and some legislatures with bystander 
recovery should not be surprising. 11 has weaknesses from both strands of 
ethereal torts: it provides recovery for an injury that is both purely 
emotional and it is, in a sense, a relational injury, in that some relationship 
(usually family) is required for recovery. The injury is not actually an 
injury to the rclationsbip, but the emotional distress that results is a product 
of the relationship. Thus, proof of the relationship serves to corroborate 
that extreme emotiona 1 distress likely would result from observing injury to 
the person. 
The demise of criminal conversation and alienation of affections began 
in the 1930s as the ethereal torts were beginning their arduous ascent. 
Criminal convcrsatioo and alienation of affections have been, since the 
220. Levi� supra nocc 48, at 163-74 (discussing "significant institutional barriers" that have 
limited development or cthcll'C81 torts). 
221. Chamalll!!l, s11pra note 48, at 500 ("Like emotional harms, relational injuries continue 
10 rank at the bottom of the legal hierarchy orinjuric.1. "); Levit, s11pra note 48, at 163· 74. 
222. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968). 
223. Coruol. Rall Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 534 n.3 (1994). 
224. California wu the fim state to re<:ognize such a ton rocovcry with dis1inct elements 
tbalsbould beconsidcrcd in Diiion. 441 P.2d 11 912-28. Because of concerns that the tort was 
1o0 ill-defined and pcrbaps lhat liability was being expanded too much, the California Supreme 
Coul1 tightened the ton and transformed the Diiion considerations into clements that must be 
"'°"""in 171/ng v. La Cluua, nt P .2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989). 
The Louisiana Supcemc: Court first recognized bystander recovery in Ltjeune v. Rayne 
Bronch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990). The coun articulated four elements that had to be 
satlllicd for rocovcry. Id. at 570. The legislature responded by enacting Civil Code anicle 
2315.6, in which it adopted the elements from Lejeune, but restticted the family relationship to 
specified rclationshipS-<lpousc, child, paren� sibling, grandparent, or grandchild. LA. OVJL 
CODE M'N. an. 2315.6, n.I S (West 1997). The Louisiana Supreme Court arguably restricted 
recovery beyond the language of the article in Trahan v. McManus, 128 So. 2d 1273, 1278-80 
(La. 1999). 
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demise of the property underpinning, pure relational torts, and the recovery 
is solely for emotional injuries. On the relational torts side, criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections are like loss of consortium in their 
recognition of remedy for injuries to family relationships. They are, 
however, more susceptible to criticism than loss of consortium on two 
grounds. First, in loss of consortium claims, the relative has been the victim 
of some freestanding tort, usually of the well-established variety, and the 
relative has suffered some injury, usually physical. Thus, the derivative 
nature of the loss of consortium claim distinguishes it from criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections. This point will be discussed more 
fully below. Second, in loss of consortium claims the relative has been the 
unwilling victim of a distinct tort; in contrast, in criminal conversation and 
alienation of affections, the spouse may be a willing participant in conduct 
tha.t de>es not constitute a separate tort. 
2. Special Problems of Relational Torts 
a. The Favored Derivative Relational Torts 
Setting aside the occasional relational torts, there arc tort theories that 
redress only injuries to relationships. Included among these arc torts and 
elements of damages that address family relationships (wrongful death, loss 
of consortium, criminal conversation, and alienation of affections), business 
relationships (interference with business or contracrual relations), and 
employment relationships (wrongful discharge).m Among these, wrongful 
death and loss of consortium are different from the others in that they are 
derivative, anchored to some independent tort to the relative of the 
consortium plaintiff, and usually226 a tort that caused death or physical 
injury. In this way, wrongful death and loss of consortium, arc similar to 
bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tethered to "hard" 
injuries to person, these torts do not cause the courts as much concern about 
permitting recovery. 227 Accordingly, it is wrongful death and loss of 
consortium that are the most widely accepted and least controversial among 
225. "There are other relationships, such :as political and community or social. See Green, 
supra DOie 49. 
226. I qualify this because there are loss of consonium cases in which 1he relative of the 
plaintiff suffered reputational or emotional injury rather than physical injury. Su, e.g., Minion 
v. Gaylord"s lnt"I Corp., 541 So. 2d 209, 209 (La. CL App. 1989) (children of victim of 
malicious prosecution brought loss of oonsortium claims). 
227. Cbamallas, supra note 48, at 502 ("Tort law . . .  generally tteats relational injwics 
merely as supplemental lo 'primary' claims for physical hann . . . .  j. 
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the pure relational torts. 228 Wimess the troubled careers of the other pure 
but freestanding relational tons. First, the successful assault on criminal 
conversation and alienation of affectioru; is discussed above. Second, 
although many jurisdictions recognize some fonn of intentional interference 
with business or contractual relations, 229 it is also one of the most 
controversial torts, provoking considerable scholarly criticism. 2lO Finally, 
some jurisdictions recognize the tort of wrongful termination, while others 
do not, and tl1e scope of the tort in those jurisdictions that recognize it 
varies.n• Thus, being freestanding relational torts puts alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation in the camp of the weaker relational 
torts. 
It is a significant cha.racteristic of the relational torts that the freestanding 
relational torts are so suspect and controversial. ln a world of "new 
property," where relationships arc more important than ownership of 
tangible property, 232 it is remarkable that tort Jaw does not provide more 
protection against conduct that directly interferes with relationships.m It is 
indicative of the fact, however, that tort law has recognized emotional and 
relational banns, but it has not provided protection against such hanns at the 
same level as it bas to banns to physical property and person. Some 
commentators. noting this imbalance, have described this as a residual 
historical bias and one that has a disparate impact on women, who suffer 
more emotional and relational injuries and suffer more from such injuries 
228. Id. ar SOI (labeling wrongful dealh and loss of consortium as !he rnosr impo11ar11 bMcs 
for compcnsa1ion for ncgligen1 intciferenc:e wilh relationships). 
229. Sttgmtral/y OOBBS, mpra no4e 1, ch. 32; Gergen, J'lll"'O note 184, at 1180.81. 
230. Stt. 11.g., Dobbs, supra DOie 24; Dowtina. n;pra note 46; Harvey S. Perlman, 
lnttrfenmce with Contract and Other Economic E:xpecta•cieJ: A Clash of Tort and Contract 
Docrrln•, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1982). 
231. Sttgmtral/y MARK A. R<m!STEIN ET AL., E>.!Pl.OVMENT I.AW ch. 8 (2d ed. 1999). I 
limit lhc discussion betc to the ton of wroogful discharge in violation of pub lic policy. I 
recognize, however, that some jurisdictions treat breach of the covenan1 of good faith and fair 
dealing as a tort lhcory. 
232. Stt mpra nolCs 48-S0, 146-149 and accompanying teXL 
233. Stt Levit, supra note 48, at ISO ("The development of procection for relational 
interests evidences a communitarian view of the role of ton law . • . •  The vision being promoted 
is one of responsible .s.ocia1 internet.inn: a commitment lo 1he value of the permanency of 
rela1ionships and to appropriate treatment within those relationships."). 
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than do men. "4 Tort law evolves to recognize new conditions in changed 
society, but old biases and priorities do not give way quickly or easily. :m 
b. The Disfavored Freestanding Relational Torts 
Even within the weaker subset of pure and freestanding relational torts, 
there are characteristics that suggest additional sources of concern with 
criminal conversation and alienation of affections. All of the freestanding 
relational torts are interference torts236-that is, someone interferes with the 
relationship, and that interloper is the tortfeasor and defendant 
i. The Marriage Interference Torts Compared With the 811siness 
Interference Torts 
The business interference torts are among the most controversial theories 
in tort law, and yet they are more widely accepted than criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections.237 All states in the United States 
now reco�e some version of interference with business or contractual 
relations. They provide a logical point of comparison with criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections because of similarities: they have 
234. Cbamallas, supro note 48; su olso K0<0nig & Rustad, supra note 203, at 19-20, 24-29 
(discussing the evolution in ton law to recognize emotional and relational injuries to women, 
but also noting that gendered nanue of ton remedies is obscured, and ton reform movement will 
restric1 rights won by feminists). 
23:5. Cbamallas, supro note 48. Professor Bernstein bas described the paradoxes that are 
most helpful t() !()It wlJlll��. �!JISlci!!, wp.r o oo!� 45, Ill 1S44-52. Lilck of novelty and less 
''onness" (being tied to contract or property law) are two of the paradoxes that facilitate 
recognition. Id. 
236. Doess, supra note 7, at ch. 31-32. Chapter 31 of Professor Dobbs' treatise is entitled 
"Interference with Family Relationships," and it includes discussion of criminal conversation 
and alienation of affections. Cliapter 32 is entitled "Interference with Contract and Economic 
Opponunity Generally," and it includes discussion of intentional and negligent interference with 
busine:ss and contractual relations and wrongful discharge from employment See also 
MARsHAU. S. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW, 965-91 (2d ed. 2000). 
237. See ERIC RASMUSEN, AN ECoNOMIC APPROACH TO ADULTERY 17 (Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business, Harvard John M. O lin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 
322, 2001) (noting that while alienation of affections has gone out of style, "[o)ddly enough, the 
similar action of tonious interference with contract is alive and well."), available at 
http://www.law.barvard.cdulprograms/olin_ce:nter.bbnl. 
238. Gaiy D. Wexler, Intentional Interference with Contract: Market Efficiency and 
Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CoNN. L. REV. 279, 292 (1994). Louisiana was the last 
state to recognize the ton in 1989 in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989). 
Looisiana reoogniud a Vtf'J lifilited venion of !lie tort and has adhered to that version. 
Healthcare Mgmt Servs., Inc. v. Vantage Healthplan, Inc., 748 So. 2d 580 (La. Ct. App. 1999) 
(recognizing limitation of Spumey). 
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common historical roots;239 they are freestanding relational torts; and they 
are third-party interference torts. Moreover, the debate over the appropriate 
theory and scope of the business interference torts was being waged around 
the time of the first wave of legislative abrogation of the heart balm torts.1AO 
While I do think the comparison is informative in considering the role of 
relational tort law, 1 do not mean to suggest that every aspect of law and 
regulation that is appropriate for business and commerce is appropriate for 
marriage and family. 241 
Critics of the business interference torts argue that they undermine the 
doctrine of efficient breach. 242 The efficient breach doctrine is traced to 
Oliver Wendell Holmes' statement: "the duty to keep a contract at common 
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it­
and nothing else."243 Proponents of efficient breach theory thus argue that 
there is nothing wrongful about a breach, and that by permitting efficient 
breaches, the law facilitates movement of resources to their most valuable 
use. 244 The critics thus point out that the business interference torts 
discourage efficient breaches by discouraging third parties from offering 
better deals as alternatives to existing business relationships. "If a person is 
free to breach a contract and pay damages, why should it be tortious for a 
third party to induce the contract party to do what she is free to do?"24s 
In some cases, the business interference torts would impose liability on a 
third-party interferer when contract law would not impose breach of 
contract liability on the party terminating the relationship. This situation is 
analogous to criminal conversation and alienation of affections because one 
of the partners to a marriage can terminate it on the basis of irreconcilable 
differences. Consider, for example, an employee who has an employment-
239. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 341; Gergen, supra note 184, at 1200-01. Professor Gergen 
describes three theories regarding the historical roots of the tort. 
240. Gergen,supranote l84,at 1211-18. 
241. Cf., Difo111.0, supra note 53, at 958-59 ("To insist on the business na!llie of marriage 
vows not only demeans their importance, but emphasizes enforcement at the oost of the very 
trust most beneficial to the fulfillment of those vows."). Indeed, 1 think some feminists who 
decry the commodification of sex will object to the comparisons and the use of commercial and 
business language to draw some parallels. For discussion of feminist opposition to the 
commodification of sexual relations, see CHAMALLAS, supra note 152, at 230.36. 
242. See. e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 185, § 21.3 (1999); Perlman, supra note 230, at 78-91; 
Dowling, supra note46, at 506-10. 
243. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). It has 
been argued, however, that the efficient breach theory results from a misreading of Holmes. 
Perillo, supra note 219. 
244. Woodward, supra note 156, at 1139. 
245. Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine of 
Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer, 41 BUFF. L 
REv. 645, 674 (1999). 
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at-will contract with her employer, and she is induced by another employer 
to leave that employment and accept employment with him. According 10 
the Restatement (Secood), the interference would be actionable.246 Why, 
critics ask, should a third party be liable for inducing the employee to do 
what she had a right to without incurring any liability for breach of 
conttact? 247 
The comparison to interference with marriage is particularly apt. 2411 
Given that divorce is available now without proof of fault, 249 marriage is in 
ways li.ke an at-will employment relationship: it can be terminated for good 
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. If a spouse is free to end a marriage 
at will, why then should a third party be liable for contributing to the end of 
the marriage?250 Although a comparison between interference torts in the 
context of terminable at-will business relations and in the context of 
marriages that can be terminated without proof of fault is instructive, I will 
preface that comparison by recognizing that marriages are not exactly like 
terminable at-will business relationships. The state and the law do become 
involved in the dissolution of marriages, but not in the termination of at-will 
contracts. The state involvement suggests that the state recognizes the 
implication of third-party interests in a way that it does not with privately 
handled a1-will contracts. Thus, even if efficient breach doctrine might call 
for limitations on the business interference torts, such limitations might not 
necessarily be appropriate for interference with marriage torts. 
One response applicable to both the business interference torts and the 
marriage interference torts is that the focus on whether the party to the 
246, RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 766 cmL g; ste also E.D. Locey Mills, Inc. v, Keith, 
359 S.E.2d 148, I 55-S6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "maliciou.s and wrongful inlcrferencc with 
such employment by anothtt is actionable althou&b the employment be II will"). 
247. See. e.g., Perlman. supra note 230, at 90-91 ("lr the efficiency principles or contract 
law suggest that a third party using lawful means should DOI be liable for inducing breach of 
enfo<ceable promises, then a fortiori, the same rule should apply to wrenforcable 
eJ<pectancics."); EPSTEIN, supra note l 8S, at 584, 
248. I thank ProrCSSO< Bemslein ror challenging me on this poirlL Sbe argues that the 
bu.siness interference ION, for whatever problems they have, continue to require intent to harm 
the relationship, and in this criminal conversation and alienation of affections differ from the 
business interference tons becllUse intent to hann the relationship usually is not the purpose or 
the third party. While I agree that most third parties do not have lite subjective purpose or 
dama�ng a marriage, I tbinlc if knowledge or the existence or the marriage is eslablished (as I 
would require under my proposed modlfied ton or intentional interference with marriage), then 
the objective definition or tortious intent, knowledge to a substantial ccnainty, is satisfied. See. 
e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P .2d 1091 (Wash. 1955). 
249. Stt gt:neral/y Difonzo, supra note SJ. 
2SO. DOBBS, supa note 7, at 1247; lra M. Ellman & Stephen D. Sugannan, Spousal 
Enwrianal Abuse as a Tort?, SS MD. L. REV. 1268, 1297 (1996); McDougal, supra note 32, at 
182-83. 
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contract could be liable for breach at the time of tennination docs not 
consider the full range of potential liability. An at-will employee, for 
example, may be free to leave his employer, but there is conduct that she 
can engage in while employed that may give rise to a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty, trade secrets violation, or unfair trade practiccs.251 
Similarly, a spouse may be free to terminate a marriage, but adultery is 
conduct that oocurs while married, and many states still treat it as illegal, 
even if they do not impose civil liability. m 
A second response is given by a defender of the business interference 
torts. Professor Woodward argues that the contractarian view-if no breach 
of contract damages could be awarded against the party, then no tort 
liability should be lmposed on the third-party interferer-ignores the bigger 
picture of relationships and the benefits that they bestow on those who are 
not parties to the relationship.2" According to Professor Woodward's 
argument, because contract law docs not cover all the interests implicated in 
relationships, there is room for tort law, and contract law should not provide 
the boundaries for recovery. 2.!4 
Professor Woodward's defense applies with at least equal force to 
criminal conversation and alienation of affections. Third parties, most 
significantly childrcn2" in some cases, and society at large have interests in 
the stability of marriages. Just as contract law does not occupy the whole 
251. ROTllSTEJN, supm no«e 231, §§ 7.11, 7.12. 
252. The plaintiff in an Idaho case sought, unsucc:essllilly, to expand the action for criminal 
conversation to her husbend. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 815 (Idaho 1994). 
253. Woodward,supn1llO(e 156,at 1170-76. 
254. Id. at 1179. <Anrro Perlman, supm note 230, at 90 ("Rules regulatina third-pany 
interference should advance whatever policy contract law pursues in withholding enforcement 
of an agreement."). 
255. Recently, the conuoversy of whether children suffer lifelong banns from divorces was 
rekindled by Dr. Judith Wnllerstein's controversial book, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce. 
WALLERSTEIN ET AL, supra nOlc 29. See Kim, n1pra note 30 (discussing the conuoversy over 
the effects 1>f divorce on children). Polls indicate that Americans do believe that divorces hann 
children. In a poll conducted for Time/CNN in September 2000, 64% of those responding to 
the survey said that childmi are "almost always" or "frequently" harmed by divon:e. Id. The 
concern ova the effeclS of divorce on children also is indicated by a bill recently introduced in 
Colomdo, the Childml of Divorce Protection Act, that would have required married couples 
with depend'.ent childml, after filing for divorce, to underao a year of coU11Seling, focusing on 
"CUJTCnt and future potential hann to children" before the divorce would become final. H.R. 01-
1342, 63rd Gen. Ass em, I st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 200 I); see Trent Seibert, Wcmren: Divorce Biii 
Scary, DENVER POST, Feb. 27, 2001 at A·l3. The bill provided some exceptions IO the 
coU1lSeling t'Cquitcment, including cases of physically or pSychologically abusive spouses. Id. 
The bill failed in a legislative committee. Kyle Henley, lrrtconcilable Difftrencts Kiii Divorce 
Bil� ClAZE:TTE (Boulder), March 9, 2001, at Al. After the bill's defea� the sponsor of the bill, 
Slate representative Dave Schultheis, said, "This bill, I consider, is a shot across the bow of the 
culntre of divorce. It is a baule against the S1aluS quo, and it is a battle for our children." Id. 
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field of business and protect all of the interests implicated by contracts, 
family law, which addresses the termination of marriages, may not occupy 
the whole field of marriages and protect all of the interests implicated. 
Third, differences between criminal conversation and alienation of 
affections on the one hand and the business torts on the other make the at­
will argument less forceful in the marriage context. The harm redressed by 
criminal conversation, at least, is not necessarily the teanination of the 
relationship. Stated differently, a plaintiff is suing for economic damage 
resulting from the destruction of the business relationship in the business 
interference torts. In contrast, a plaintiff in a criminal conversation action is 
suing for the emotional distress caused by the adultery, regardless of 
whether the marriage is terminated. 
Another argument against the business interference torts, based on the 
efficient breach doctrine, is that the business interference tons deter 
efficient breaches, and this thwans movement of resources to their most 
valuable use. This is often framed as a criticism of the business interference 
tons for thwarting competition. ZS6 Indeed, the privilege or justification of 
competition is an issue that often arises in the business interference cases.m 
I have never read an argument that criminal conversation and alienation of 
affection should be nbolished because they stifle competition in the market 
for sexual relations. Nonetheless, society's attitudes toward adultery and 
the incidence of adultery"' indicate that this may be one of the reasons for 
opposition to the torts. Indeed, the argument regarding personal autonomy 
is a version of this argument: a married person is still an autonomous hwnan 
being and may choose to have extramarital sexual relations. ls this not a 
competition, open markets, and efficient breach argument? 
Professor Epstein forcefully aniculates one aspect of the competition 
argument when he says, "[i]t clogs competition even to hint that T might 
quit his job with P before he is allowed to eotenain offers from D."2.19 Does 
the same competition and efficient breach argument apply to marriages? 
That is, should a spouse be able to sample the market for better offers 
before deciding whether to terminate the marriage? Although the question 
may sound icily economic as applied to marriages, one could argue that 
making that option available may save marriages because one may go out 
on the sexual relations market, entertain competitive offers, and decide to 
2S6. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 1S6, at 1 171; &sl'EIN, supra note 18S, at 576. 
2S7. Woodward, supra note IS6, at 11 18-19; El'STEIN, supra note 185, at S76. 
2S8. See infra notes 335-38 and accompanying text. 
259. EPSTEIN, supra note ISS, at S84. 
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remain in the marriage. 260 Under a more restrictive regime, one may so 
strongly wish to test one's market power that one is willing to end the 
marriage, if necessary, to do so. This is not an easy issue. Even if we 
choose to adopt a regime that attempts to control competition in the 
extramarital sexual relations market, we must admit that such a regime will 
not be completely successful 261 Moreover, that failure to deter some 
extramarital sexual competition may save some maniages. 
One final point of comparison between the business interference tons 
and the marriage interference torts is in order. One commentator, in 
comparing the torts, wrote as follows: "In one sense, liability for 
interference with contract is less justified than even the alienation of 
affections action. lo the business realm the injured party may still sue under 
the contract, but under the bean balm statutes the rejected lover bas no 
remedy at all."262 At first blush, this sounds like a weak justification for the 
marriage interference torts vis-a-vis the business interference torts. Does it 
amount to nothing more than, when a person gets hurt, there must be 
someone to sue? In part, that is the argument. But, the purpose of tort law 
is, in pan, to provide civil redress so that "[t]be law reigns, not fits of 
private vengeance."26l Interference with famil y is an area where emotions 
aic panicularly bot, and the potential for blood feuds is the highest. If tort 
Jaw will not provide a remedy against the spouse, leaving that area of 
regulation to divorce law, and the interference is considered wrongful, then 
tort law's providing a remedy against the third-party interferer might serve a 
well-recognized objective of the civil Jaw-providing recourse for a 
wrongfully inflicted injury. Maybe that is one reason why, even after the 
abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of affe<:tions in most 
jurisdictions, plaintiffs continue trying to find ton theories that can be made 
to apply to adultery. 264 
ii. The Marriage Interference Torts Compared with the 
Employment Torts 
260. Notwilh.nanding the pain lhat is caused by disclosed or discovered extramarital affairs, 
some marriages survive. Stt. t.g., SPRING, supra note S; Kay Miller, After an Affair, STAR 
lltlBVNE{Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan. 23, 2000, al IE. 
261. >.£ already discussed,, courts, legislllOrS, llld comm<ntatOrs who have favored 
abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of affections have argued that extramarital 
sexual activity is not �rrcd by law. I am DOI willing IO concede that i bas DO delern:nt effect 
wliauoever, but I do coocede that, like most tort law, ii will not deter all misconduct. 
262. Dowlin& supra noce 46, at 489. 
263. Zipur.;Jcy, supra note 193, 11 84. 
264. For a diJcussion of alternative theories pW'lued by plaintiffs, - supra aoces 11 S-27 
llld acc:ompanying text. 
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The employment tort that is most analogous to the marriage interference 
torts is third-party interference with an employment relationship. That tort 
already has been covered above as an interference with business ton. There 
is 8J1 additional employment relational tort that merits comparison with the 
marria�e interference to1ts. Wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy""' is different from the other freestanding relational torts in that it 
involves only two paities. It is the one type of interference tort in which the 
interference is perpetrated by a party to the contract or relationship. 266 It 
also is one of the newest tort theories, tracing its origins to Professor 
Lawrence Blades' article, Employment at Wiii vs. Individual Freedom: On 
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power.u.1 
There are three interesting parallels between wrongful termination and 
the marriage interference torts that are worth noting. First, this is a context 
in which, under contract law, the paities to the relationship usually are free 
to terminate the relationship without liability. Employment at will is the 
starting point for virtually all American labor and employment law.2611 
Under this doctrine, employers have almost unfenered freedom to tenninate 
employees. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, either party to 
an employment relationship may terminate the relationship for a good 
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. 269 When Professor Blades 
proposed the tort of abusive discharge, he recognized that his proposal 
represented a significant impingement of tort law in an area theretofore 
26S. MoSI of lhc theories of �very for employment termina1ion arc breach of c<>nlrael 
theories, such as breach of cxprcu conimct terms, promissory cstoppcl, and breach of the 
covenant of good failh. In contmsl, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a 
relational ton �1eory. See DOBllS, s11pra note 7, at § 454; RoTHSTEIN, supra note 231, ch. 8. 
266. Professor Dobbs state& lhat breach of a contract to wh.ich lhe breacher is a party 
technically is DOI an interference. Doees, supra note 7, at 1287. Nonetheless, Dobbs recognizes 
lhat, since one can view such tons u interference wilh one's own conll'1Ct, they belong in tbc 
same chapter of tbc treatise wilh thc business intcrfemi<:e ions. Id. 
267. Lawrmce Blades, Emplo)'mtnt at Wifl V$. Individual Frttdom: On Umfting the 
Aburfrll Exercls• o/Empto,.er Power, 67 COWM. L. R.Ev. 1404 (1967). The tol1 actually can be 
traced to as early as 1959. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless nger: A Critique of 
the Model Employment Tennfnatfo11 Act, 43 A'il. U. L. Rev. 849, 865 (1994) (citing California 
case). It did not rake hold, however, until tbc publication of Professor Blades' groundbreaking 
aniclc. Professor Blades actually 11fBUed for a broader abusive discharge tort lhan lhe current 
vCJSions of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, but his anicle fueled the debate 
over ton law's impingement on employment at will. Blades, supra. 
268. Moniana is the exception, having enacted lhe Montana Wrongful Disclvge from 
Employment Act of 1987, which imposes a good cause termination requirement on most jobs 
beyond a probationary period. MO)>IT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 10 39-2-914 (200t). 
269. Blades, supra note 267, at 1405 (quoting Payne v. Western & All. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 
519-20 (1884), overruled 011 other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)). 
The source of the "rule" is generally said to be American legal writer Horace Gay Wood in A 
TkEATISE ON THE v. w Of MASTER AND SERVA>(]" (1877). RontSTE!N, supra note 231, al 671. 
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governed by contract law. Nonetheless, given the importance of 
employees' interest in the employment relationship, be argued that it was 
appropriate to circumvent the "unyield%§" contract principles in favor of 
"the more elastic principles of tort Jaw.' Thus, where the interest of the 
individual and society is significant and contract Jaw provides no remedy, it 
is appropriate to fashion a relationail tort. 
Marriage is governed largely by family law. There is a principle of 
family law regarding marriages that is analogous to employment at will­
no-fault divorccs.271 Under the no-fault divorce regime, parties to a 
marriage essentially can teaninate the relationship for "irreconcilable 
differences"m-good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. The absence 
of a family law or contract remedy, however, should not be a reason to 
refuse to recognize a relational tort if that is appropriate in consideration of 
the interests of the injured individual, third parties, and society. 273 I think 
the societal and individual interests are sufficiently important to justify the 
incursion of tort law into family law. Note, however, that the remedy for a 
marriage interference tort is not against the other party to the relationship, 
as in wrongful discharge, but instead it is against a third-party interferer. 
Should a tort recovery be recognized against the unfaithful spouse?274 That 
issue is beyond the scope of this article, and it involves creating greater 
tension between tort law and famiiy law, which generally permits no-fault 
270. Bladcs,.ntpro no!C269,at 1422. 
271. I am not fighting lhe battle of fault-based versus no-fault divorces or regular marriages 
ve11US covenant marriages. See generally Diflonzo, si1pra ooto SJ. Louisiana and Arizona have 
legislatively adopted covenant marriage, which makes divorce less accessible. LA. R.Ev. STAT. 
AAN. §§ 9:272 to 9:27S.I (West 1998); M.12.. REV. STAT. /\liW. §§ 2S·901 to 2S·906 (West 
2000). Regarding the Louisiana act, � Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant 
Marriage: Social Analysis and legal lmplfcations, S9 LA. L. REV. 63 (1998). Covenant 
marriage bills have been pr�d in several other alltes. Lynn Marie Kohm. A Comparath'f! 
Sun<eyo/Covmant Marriage Proposals in thtt Unitm States, 12 REGENT U. L. �. 31 (1999); 
Stfl also Brian H. Bllc, Smte of I he Union: 17re Stares' lntere$1 In the Marita/ Star11s of Their 
Citizens, SS U. MlAMI L. R.Ev. I (2000). The Colorado legislature recently considered a highly 
publicized bill lhat generally woold baVc required spo=s with children to undergo a year of 
counseling before divorcing. Stt H.R. 01-1342, 63rd Gen. Asscm, ht Reg. Sess. (Colo. 
2001). The bill ultimately was defeated in committee. See Henley. supra note 2SS, at Al. 
272. Difonm, supra note S3, at 884-88. 
273. &e Victor E. Scbwutt. Tire Serious Marital Offendu: Tort Law 11.t a Solution, 6 FAM. 
LQ. 219, 225 (1972). Professor Schwartz argues for recognizing a tort action against a serious 
mariial olTendcr--Oiat is a spouse. A tort action against a divorcing spouse docs oot undermine 
the no-fault divorce regime, he argues, bccallSe fault is not being used u the basis for the 
divorce, Uld the conduct lhat is actionable is beyond the "normal hostile acts" or divorcing 
spouses. Id. at 225. 
274. This is what the plaintiff argued in Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994). 
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divorces.275 Although I am not prepared to argue for a tort theory against a 
spouse who commits adultery, leaving the matter for now to divorce law, I 
think there are some good arguments for such a theory. 276 
A second parallel between the marriage interference torts and wrongful 
discharge is that courts are reluctant to get involved in second guessing 
decision makers in divorces and employment terminations. Although both 
involve among the most gut-wrenching of emotional injuries, courts do not 
like to deal with the difficult issues of determining whether wrongful 
conduct has occurred, allocating fault, and determining causation. One 
judge, di cussing employment at-will, recognized the courts' reluctance in 
both areas as follows: "Our law chooses not to involve itself with the unfair 
and subjective treatment leading to these broken at-will relationships in a 
275. Schwa.11Z, s11pra note 273. Professor Schwartz did not take issue with �1c no-faull 
divorce regime, but he argued for the need for tort-based liability for "serious marital 
offenders." He contended that an act of adultery would not satisfy the requirements of the tort, 
but ho did say that if a spouse corrunittcd adultery and "bmg[ gcd] about it with the intent to 
cause his spouse resultant serious emotional harm," whe�m that act satisfied the tort should be 
a jury question. Id. at 22S. Ironically, in liaht of Schwartz's poinl it was the unfaithful 
spouse's nondisclosure of his extramarital affair that made viable the wife's banery claim 
agaim1 him in Neal v. Neal. 873 P.2d at 875. For discussion of the Neal case, see supra notes 
118-120 and accompanying text. One researcher concluded, on the basis of a survey, that 
talking about all the details of an affair is more likely to save a marriage than is trying not to 
focus on the affair and avoiding talk about it. Francine Russo, Wiii He Cheat? WI// You?, 
RED900K, June I, 2000, at 132 (discussing survey by San Diego-based psychological consultant 
Peggy Vaughan). Regarding tort lheories against a spouse, see also Ellman & Sugannan, s11pra 
note 250, at 1268 (considering argumen1s for and against recognition of a tort of spousal 
emotional abuse under the rubric of intentional infliction of emotional distress; concluding that 
such recognition probably would be a mistake). 
276. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. L\RSON, HARO BARGAINS: TuE P01.mcs OF SEX 
283-86 (1998) (arguing for a tort theory of adultery). I thank Professor Chamallas for her 
insight that my failure to take a position on the tort theory against the unfaithful spouse weakens 
the analogy to wrongful tennination. Although I am no1 prepared to argue for that tort in this 
article, I think the arguments for such a theory of recovery are persuasive. 
Professor Larson has argued for a lort theory of sexual fraud. Larson, supra note 59. 
Professor Dan Subolnik, in response to Larson, has argued that if an obligation were imposed on 
norunanied sexual partners to tell the truth, then such a tort should be recognized for spouses. 
Dan Subotnik, "Sue Me. Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love Yo11" A Disquisition on Law, 
Sex, a11d Talk, 4 7 Fl.A. L. REv. 311, 358 (1995). Subotnik suggests that we are not ready lo 
recognize such a tort between spouses. Id. Of course, this is precisely the set of circumstances 
under which the plaintiff in Neal v. Neal stated a viable battery claim against her ex-husband. 
873 P.2d at 875. She argued that, bad she known of her ex-husband's adultery, she would have 
found sexual relations with him offensive, thus constituting a banery. Id. at 876. Moreover, she 
argued 1hat her consent was negated by her husband's misrepresentation through nondisclosure. 
Id. at 876-77. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized a viable battery claim without 
crea ting a new tort of sexual fraud. Id. 
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manner which is somewhat analogous to no-fault divorce."2n One 
commentator has posited that a reason that American jurisdictions 
unanimously adopted employment at will was that it enabled the courts to 
dismiss cases in which they did not think they were competent to evaluate 
the termination decisions of employers.m 
A third parallel between the marriage interference torts and wrongful 
discharge is that employment is one of the major relationships that people 
have, not only providing a livelihood, but also contributing much to a 
person's identity. 279 The relationship is deemed so important that it is 
necessary for tort law to be invoked to protect the relationship. The same 
thing might be said of marriage. 
B. Femillism, Liberalism, Sexual Libertarianism, and Commrmitarianism 
Feminists led the campaign to abolish the heart balm torts. 280 Male 
legislators in Indiana "gallantly" yielded their support, and even playfully 
voted token opposition before becoming serious and supporting the 
feminists. 281 Feminists of the early 1900s through the 1980s, rebelling 
against the image of the powerless, economically dependent, and sexually 
repressed woman, embraced the liberal ideals of individualism and 
autonomy, which called for government to keep its hands out of regulation 
of sex through law. Some feminists in the 1990s began questioning whether 
a sexual free market adequately protects and advances the interests of 
women, while libertarians have continued to support nonintervention by 
government and a free market of sexual choice and activity. At the same 
time, communitarian ideals of collectivity and responsibility have attracted 
some feminists to reconceptualize their views of legal regulation of sexual 
activity. Moreover, some torts theorists have embraced comrnunitarianism 
and seen its precepts as supporting a larger role for relational torts. 
Feminists, liberals, libertarians, and comrnunitarians-what do they have 
to do with criminal conversation and alienation of affections? What role 
2n. Nicholas v. Allstare Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d 830, 8SO (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Caraway, J., 
dissenting), rev'd, 165 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000). 
278. Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of 
the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. RE.v. 679 (1994). 
279. Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the 
Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L REY. 719, 719 (1991) ("The 
identification of personality with employment elevates employment to a very high ranking 
among the non-economic interests valued by Americans."). 
280. See supra noteS 92-114 and accompanying text 
281. Aching Hearts, supra note 96 (reponing that fiv.� men voted "no" "in a spirit of fun" 
before changing their voteS). 
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have various ideologies played in the demise of the heart balm torts? In 
short, feminists, fueled by liberal views of autonomy and individualism, 
spearheaded the assault on the heart balm torts. 
Recently, some femin.ist scholars have called for re-examination of two 
of the heart balm torts. Professor Mary Coombs, in describing the role of 
feminists in abolishing the breach-of-promise tort, recognized that feminists 
took the position they did to help women break out of the subservient and 
dependent role they played in traditional marriages. 282 · She observes that 
they perceived it to be in women's  best interest in the long run, and to do 
otherwise would have had ideological costs.283 She observes, however, that 
although the breach-of-promise tort was "imperfect," it did provide a 
remedy for women who had suffered real injuries. 284 Her thesis, then, is 
that feminists today should not be as dismissive of the actions of 
"traditional" and "activist right-wing" women as were the feminists who 
fought against the breach-of-promise tort. 285 
Professor Larson, in an article that has attracted considerable attention, 
advocated revisiting the tort of seduction and, from its ashes, resurrecting a 
new tort of sexual fraud. 286 She recounts the role of the earlier feminists, 
and like Professor Coombs, she concludes that feminists took such active 
roles in the anti�heart balm movement because the success was a symbolic 
victory, replacing the Victorian concept of economically dependent and 
sexually passive women who were no more than men's property, with a 
new conception of emancipated women. 287 She notes tlie tension between 
the rhetoric of women being depicted as golddiggers and men as victims on 
the one hand, and the feminist · goal of advancing a new vision of women on 
the other hand. 288 
When the second wave of anti-heart balm legislation came in the 1970s, 
it occtirred at the same time that many other faws governing sexual relations 
were in a state of change, including rape laws and sexual harassment law .289 
It also occurred at a time when feminism had become a major force in 
American society. 290 Professor Larson, in proposing the new tort of sexual 
fraud, argues that feminist adherence to the liberal value of autonomy will 
282. Coombs, supra note 59, at 14. 
283. Id. at 17.  
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 21-23. 
286. Larson, supra note 59. 
287. Id. at 397-99. 
288. Id. at 394-40 1 .  
289. Id. at 400. 
290. Sinclair, supra note 1 03,  at 96-97 (discussing the societal arid legal changes of the 
1960s and 1970s wrought by feminists). 
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not better the position of women. She argues that many women remain 
economically dependent on men in traditional relationships.291 In view of 
that reality, the libertarian rhetoric which opposes legal regulation of sexual 
activity does not serve women well.292 Thus, she urges feminists to re­
examine their allegiance to the libertarian "sexual free market"29J and to 
support "a sexually nonrepressive, �t interventionist, regime of sexual 
regulation in lbc interests of women." This view leads her to propose the 
tort of sexual fraud. 
Professor Larson is not alone in her view that the liberal ideals of 
autonomy and individualism and the libertarian mantra of nonregulation are 
not adequate to advance the best interests of women. Professor Nedelsky 
has argued that feminists need to redefine the liberal ideal of autonomy in a 
way that includes communitarian ideals.29' 
Another commentator has urged a re-examination of law governing the 
premarital relationship. 296 She posits that the argument from the anti-heart 
balm movement that love should not be commodified led to mandatory 
rules regarding return of engagement rings and a refusal on the part of 
courts to consider the claims of women for the investments they make in 
preparatioo for marriage. 297 
Libertarians, for their part, call for abstinence on the part of 
government-leaving sexual conduct to the free market. Professor 
Carrington 's prototype of the Sexual Libertarian Senator is characterized by 
a belief that individuals should make their own choices.298 It is obvious that 
libertarian ideology has been helpful to feminists in many battles, such as 
reproductive self-determination. It is not clear, however, that libertarian 
principles serve women equally well in other contexts. 
Communitarian thinking bas had an impact on tort law. For example, 
Professor Levit wrote that relational torts "evidence a communitarian view 
of the role of tort law . . . .  [in which] (t)be vision being promoted is one of 
responsible social interaction. "299 Professor Cham alias has argued that deep 
biases embedded in tort law continue to relegate emotional and relational 
torts, and concomitantly women's injuries, to a lower status in the hierarchy 
291. Lmao,svpni noce S9, at 427-28. 
292 id. at 432-33. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. at 381. 
295. Ncdclsky, supra note 149. For a discussion of communitarian ideology applied to 
relational torts, sec supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
296. Tusbnet, supN note 98, at 2587-91. 
297. Id. at 2618. 
298. Curington, supN note 60, at 864�9. 
299. Levit.supra noce48,at 150. 
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of tons, which favors the male-oriented physical and property injuries.JOO 
Although communitarian ideology seems consistent with, and supportive of, 
tort law's protection of relational and emotional interests, that docs not 
mean that all proponents of communitarian ideology believe tort law should 
expand its coverage of emotional and relational injuries. For example, 
Professor Robert Ackennan bas argued for limitations on emotiona.1 distress 
and relational injury recoveries as a way of controlling the "tort loncry."301 
He is particularly critical of the heart balm torts, writing that detennining 
the cause of the breakup of a marriage requires "judicial involvement in 
intimate and complex human relationships to a disturbing dcgree.'.JOl 
Sounding more libertarian than conununitarian, l03 Ackennan argues that the 
abolition of the heart balm torts was a move in the right direction-keeping 
courts out of people's bedrooms.304 
What happens then, when feminism, which had aligned with liberalism, 
and at times libertarianism, but now questions the marriage, looks wist fully 
at communitarianism? Do criminal conversation and alienation of 
affections look better? The answer is not clear. Professor Charnallas, who 
writes so powerfully about tbe subordination of the emotional and relational 
torts which disadvantages women, does not like the heart balm 1oru. She 
writes that, although adultery is ham1ful conduct, it is no longer useful as a 
legal category. JOS She contends that the harm resulting from adultery is "not 
the sort of injury that the law ought to redress."306 She bases this pnmarily 
on the lllstorical roots of the tort in which women we.re treated as their 
husband's property and her fear that recogni:z.ing the tons would replicate 
the sexist ideology of an earlier era.m 
In this melange, it is difficult to say which movements or ideologies or 
combinations thereof, would favor or oppose an interference with marriage 
tort. It is not far-fetched to suggest, however, that feminism, tinged with 
communitarian.ism, should favor such a tort. 
300. Cbamallas,""'"' 1I04C 48 passim. 
301. Aclcennan,supnr note 47, at 667-68. 
302. Id. at 669-701 (citttioo mitted). 
303. As he cenainly has a right to sound. ProfCS!Or Ackerman stales that, although he is 
sympathetic with communiiarianism, he is not a "True Believer." Id. a1 6S2 n. l I and 
accompanying text. 
304. Id. at 670. 
305. Cbamallas. ""'"1 note 5, al 338. 
306. Id. at 341. 
307. Id. 
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C. Regulation of the Market and Regulation of the Family: A 
Comparative Historical Perspective 
A comparison of the history of legal regulation of the commercial market 
and regulation of the family in the United States yields some insights that 
may be relevant to the demise of the marriage interference torts. Professor 
Frances Olsen describes market and family as two spheres of socfal activity 
which have been viewed as constituting a dichotomy. :MJR The family sphere 
has been characterized as female, private, and altruistic, and structuring 
people's affective lives, whereas the market has been envisioned as ma� 
public, and individualistic, and structuring people's productive lives. 
Ols-cn describes the three stages of the historical evolution of legal 
regulation of the market and the family. For the market the stages arc as 
follows: first, the feudal period of hierarchical organization and laws that 
maintained the hierarchy; second, the rise of the free (laissez-faire) market 
in which the state largely withdrew from regulation of the marketplace; and 
third, the welfare state with significant regulation of economic activity. JIO 
Olsen describes the similar historical stages of regulation of the family: 
first, the feudal family with a hierarchy that was fortified by heavy 
regulation by law; second, liberalization of the family in which government 
witlhdrew and changed the laws that ossified the hierarchical relations, thus 
moving family relations toward equal juridical rights between men and 
women; and third, the stage of the regulated family in which government, 
through courts, legislatures, and agencies, has step.�ed back in to address, 
through regulation, issues of inequality and abuse. 1 The movement in the 
market to a welfare regime has moved the market toward reduced 
individualism and a new hierarchy, whereas increased regulation of the 
family has moved it away from hierarchy and toward individualism. Jil 
Feminists, in seekjng liberalization of the hierarchical family, argued for 
individual freedoms. According to Olsen, the focus of family reform on 
individualism has made family relations resemble market relations.31J 
3:08. Olsen, supra note SS, at 1498. 
309. Id. at 1498-1501. 
310. Id. Bl 1513-15. 
31 l. Id. at 1516-18. 
312. Id. at 1528. 
313. Id. at 1519. However, refonners who spearheaded the anti-heart balm lcaislation 
wielded an argwnent that was grounded oo dilfcrentiating ma� of love from lnlnsactions in 
the commercial madcCIS. Tushnet, supra note 98, al 2589-90. They argued for a "fuewall 
between personal. disinrerested love relarions and the selfish mart.eL" Id. at 2589. Thus, it was 
both unnecessary and unseemly to allempl to assuage emotions damaged in matters of love with 
money damages. 
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As for reform efforts, Olsen criticizes perpetuating the dichotomy. 
Trying to make the family more like the market, replicates both the 
successes and the failures of the market. 314 The juridicial equality of the 
market is not adequate or appropriate for the family. As for the 
individualism of the market, as applied to the family, such individualism 
"discow1ts communal ties and promotes isolation." JIS 
What does the comparative history of regulation of the market and 
family have to do with the demise of criminal conversation and alienation 
of affections? First, it sheds some light on why the torts fell. Second, it 
may provide some insights into whether they are likely to be revived and 
whether they should be. 
As for the history, feminists supported heart balm legislation in the 
1930s and again in the 1970s. The revulsion toward the torts was based 
upon a view of them as relics of the feudal period from which they come. 316 
Although women who were injured were able to use the torts to recover, 
feminists saw them as cementing the hierarchy of the feudal family in place, 
and they preferred the individualism and autonomy that had emerged in the 
market. Even today it is the clash between the historical roots of the torts 
and modem views of the e�uality of the sexes that leads to the most robust 
denunciations of the torts. 31 
What does or should this historical perspective forecast for marriage 
interference torts? The answer is not clear, but some observations are 
relevant. Many view the family as having now moved, albeit at a slower 
pace than the market, 318 into a period in which the state becomes involved, 
once again, in regulation. Recall that during the feudal period the role of 
government regulation of family was to ossify the unequal relationships. 
Such has not been the case in the recent period of regulation. One purpose 
314. Olsen, supra note SS, at IS30. 
315. Id. 
316. It is not surprising that during the feudal period, criminal conversation and aliena1ion 
of affections were based on hierarchical relations and notions of a husband's propeny. As 
Professor Olsen explicates the feudal period, there was no separation between the market and 
the family. Id. at 1516. Both market and family were based on a hierarchy tha1 was considered 
tobethe naturalorderofthings. Id.at 1Sl3, 1516. 
Id. 
317. See, e.g., Doses. supra note 7, at 1247-48. 
[T]he torts have become offensive because they have, sometimes quite 
explicitly, treated a spouse as the property of the other spouse and because 
they are thoroughly inimical to the freedom of every human being to choose 
their associations and to depart dangerous, stultifying, or deeply unhappy 
homes if they choose. 
318. The lag theory posits that changes in the family replicate changes in the market, but 
the rate of change for the family lags behind that of the market. Olsen, supra note 55, at 1513. 
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of government regulation bas been lo help women both in the market and at 
the intersection of market and family. ln the market, for example, feminists 
supponed anti-discrimination in employment law.319 Federal anti­
discrimination law and the anti-harassment law thereunder have assisted 
women in pursuing equality in the workplace. ln contrast to the marriage 
interference torts, it has not bothered feminists that women have been 
depicted as victims of men's power In the anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, 
they have embraced that image and argued that victimization bas made the 
regulation ncccssary. m Federal law also has been called upon lo regulate 
market activity so as not to disadvantage women due to the unequal burdens 
they bear with family rewonsibility. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
amendments of Title VIl3 and the Family and Medical Leave Act322 are 
examples. 
Feminist support of federal and analogous state discrimination law 
indicates that feminists favor some governmental regulation of the market 
and perhaps the family. Does that suppon extend to only public law? As 
discussed above, some modem feminists have argued for reinstitution or 
reconsideration of modem versions of some of the heart balm torts.32J 
Moreover, other tons commentators have discussed the case for tort theories 
against abusive spouscs.3lA 
In comparing the current state of regulation of conduct in the market and 
!he family, some have noted that there is more regulation of th.e commercial 
market than of sexual conduct325 or the family. For example, leading 
commentators on tort law have noted that, although family relations are 
"among the most delicate and most im�rtant in our society," they receive 
only limited protection under tort law. 26 As discussed above, the ton of 
interference wilh business is recognized, in some form, in all states, 
319. See . .. g., Id. at 1552. 
320 Id. \tA)ntidiscnminalion law legitimates women"s C0111plaints of unfair treatment and 
provides women with a vehicle for fighting back against institutions that oppress them.'"). 
321. 42 u.s.c. § 200()e(J<)(l 994). 
322. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Although the FMLA does not 
distinguish between men and women in the entitlements it creat<s, the Act itself sllltes that "due 
to the narurc of the roles of men and women In our sociecy, the rrimary rcsponsibilicy for famil y 
caretalcing often falls on women. and such raponsibilicy affccu the working lives of women 
more than it affcctS the working lives of men." Id. at§ 2601(aX5). 
323. See la1$0n supra note 59 (proposing a new tort of se1ual fraud); cf Coombs, supra 
note 59 (suggesting that breach-of-promise lO many ton plaintiffs were IOO cavalierly sbunn<d 
by feminists who supporud abolition of the cause of aclion). 
324. Schwartz, supra note 273; Ellman & Sugannnn, supra oote 250. 
325. Larson. supra note 59, ll 412 ('"Many scholars have noted the asymmetric legal 
proteelion provided within the commercial as opposed to the SCX'lal sphere."') (citation omiaed); 
Rasmuson, supra note 237, at 17. 
326. HARPER ET AL. supra nouo 8, at 499-500. 
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although its appropriate parameters is a controversial topic.m In contrast, 
the marriage interference torts have been abolished in jurisdiction after 
jurisdiction. If family follows the market into a state of increased 
regulation, it is not far-fetched to think that some type of marriage 
interference tort might be a part of such increased regulation. It is not 
necessary that a modem tort of interference with marriage be based on 
anachronistic principles regarding men's property interests in their wives.321 
If the family is following the market, then legal theoreticians should 
overcome the common revulsion with the prior conceptualization of the 
torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affections and examine 
whether a modem iteration of the torts is an appropriate private Jaw 
regulation. 
D. American Society and Sexual Mores 
Ton theoreticians posit that tort law reflects society's valucs.'29 lf 
marital fidelity and supposed concomitant family stability are highly valued 
by American society, then why have the torts of criminal conversation and 
alienation of affections been in decline for over sixty-five years? Two 
issues merit attention here. First, what do Americans say they believe about 
adultery? Second, what are the practices of Americans regarding marital 
sexual fidelity? 
First, when surveyed, an overwhelming percentage of Americans say 
that adultery is wrong. 330 Indeed, the percentage so indicating cams the 
United States standing as the most sexually conservative nation in the 
327. Su supra DOCGr 237-247 and accompanyiJlg uoxL 
328. Su Laison, supra note 59, at 381 ("The identification of the tort of SCJCual mud with 
women's passivity and with hostilily lO sex is not 1 necessary one, but rather rcOceu the 
convergence of contingent social and historical forces.''). 
329. See, e.g .. Marshall S. Shapo, /n the Loolcing Glass: What Torrs Scholanhfp Can Teach 
Us About the American Experience, 89NW. U. L. REv. 1567, 1569 (1995) ("Tort jurisprudence 
is a rclatively accurate rcOector of American society's basic principles for microgovemance. "). 
330. Scot Lehigh, Everything Yau Always Wanted to Know About the Sexual Revolution But 
Probably Didn't Ask, BOSmN 01,.()BE, May 14, 2000, at El (discussing scholarly paper 
comparing attitudes about sex in twenty-four European and Asian countries, finding that 80% of 
Americans swveyed said that extramarital sex is always wrong); Handy, supra oouo 54. 
Although the demise of the martial inuorfercnce torts began in the 1930s, more abroptioos 
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Because of that and because $lll'VC)'S and polls were not a 
national fetish in the 1930s, this section will discuss urvey information rcgarding the last tbilty 
years. My guess is that the pcn:entagc of Americans saying adultery is wrong V.'Ould have been 
higher in the 1930s than it is now. Thus, my questioo would be the same then as now: When an 
ovCTWbelming majority of the population says something is morally wrong, sboul<I tort theories 
addrcs.1ing that conduct be abrogal1>d? 
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Western world.m A comparison of recent surveys with similar surveys in 
the late 1970s indicates that more Americans now believe adultery is wrong 
than believed that in the 1970s. "2 It probably is not surprising that adultery 
is less acceptable now than it was during the "sexual revolution" of lhe 
1960s and 1970s. 
Regarding practice, it is very difficult to get reliable data on how many 
married people have extramarital sex. A recent survey suggests that either a 
fairly high percentage of married people are having affairs, or at least, many 
Americans perceive that to be true. In the same survey in which about 85% 
said Ibey believe adultery is morally wrong, 69% said they knew at least 
one husband who had an affair, and 60% said they knew at least one such 
wife.333 In that survey, 62% said they "!bought less" of the adulterous 
husband, and 56% said they thought less of such a wife, notwithstanding 
about 85% saying they believe adultery is wrong. 3l4 
It is common political rhetoric today to discuss family values,"5 and the 
topic was not invented by former Vice President Dan Quayle. Yet, for all 
the talk, it seems appropriate to question whether Americans• love affair 
with marriages with sexual fidelity as a cornerstone is exaggerated. The 
surveys indicate that extramarital sex does occur at some significant level. 
Moreover, books, movies, ond television make it appear that extramarital 
sex is commonplace, and make it appear romantic and even heroic.336 My 
point is not to bemoan the sordid state of Hollywood, 337 but instead to 
331. Lehigh. supra nocc 330. 
332. Handy, supra note S4. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
33S. Olsen, supra note SS, at 1497; see also Larson, supra note S9, at 433 n .. 254. 
336. I do not believe this requires citation of much authority, but consider, for example, the 
book and movie The Bridges of Madison County, in which the female procagonist has an 
extnmarital alTalr with a man who COlllC$ IO her farm whil e her husband and children are away. 
The book and movie end with the man leaving, and the woman Slaying behind, and the reader or 
viewer lj)p8J'tntly supposed IO feel that it is a tragedy that she feels imprisoned in her dull life. 
ROBERT JAMES WALLER, 1llE BRIOOES OF MADISON COUNTY (1992); 1llE BRIOOES OF 
MADISON COUNTY (Warner Bros. I 99S). The producers of the recent television show 
Temptal/011 Island chose IO subject .. committed" but unmarried couples to sexual temptation. 
The producers rejected use of married couples because that would have been eocouraging 
adultery. Walt Belcher, 'Temptation Island" ls No Paradise, TAMPA Tlus., Jan. 11, 2001, at 4. 
Cheati..g Spouses: Caught on Tape on the UPN network is a hone of a different color. It 
definitely shows ICU of adultery, although it probably is no1 fair IO characterize it as promoling 
adultery. Cheating Spouses: Caughr on Tape (I.JPN television broadcast, Oct. 20, 2000). 
337. I need not do that since the Federal Trade Commission's study regarding the 
marlceting of R-rated movies, music, and video games IO children and the subsequent 
Congressional hearings undoubtedly will result in reform. See Betsy Streisand, Slasher Movies 
the Family Can Enjoy: Hollywood Con Find Loopholes in Its Promises, U.S. NEWS & WORU> 
REP., Oct. 9, 2000, at SO. 
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suggest that Hollywood and the various media have a significant impact on 
Americans• views on what is morally acceptable, or at least, on what sexual 
practices occur with some frequency. 
In the end, what can be said about sexual mores regarding adultery is that 
a very high percentage of Americans say adultery is wrong, probably some 
not insubstantial percentage engage in adultery, and most Americans 
believe adultery occurs fairly often and believe that they know someone 
who has engaged in it. There is a disconnect between the ideal and the 
actual, or what is perceived to be actual. 
Regardless of the views on marriage and sexual mores, much is being 
written and spoken about the general decline of morality and traditional 
va.lues in the United States.338 Even if Americans might believe that one 
can have an extramarital affair and still be a moral person, the issue of 
sexual fidelity could be swept up in a campaign for a "return" to traditional 
values and morality. 
V. SHOULD AN INTERFERENCE Wini MAA!UAOE TORT BE RECOGNIZED? 
Only nine states now recognize either criminal conversation, a.lie.nation 
of affections, or both. Setting aside for a moment what a modified tort 
theory of interference with marriage should look like, consider first whether 
such a theory of recovery should be recognized. 
To begin with, a strong case never was made for the abolition of criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections. 339 It bears repeating that it is a 
remarkable event that established tort theories that redress devastating 
emotional injuries were abolished without a compelling case having been 
made for their abolition. That alone is not a reason, however, that should 
sustain the rena.issaoce of such torts. I think there are good reasons for 
states to consider recognizing a new interference with marriage tort. 
A. Redress for Interferences with Family Relations 
As discussed above, tort law in the last seventy years or so increasingly 
has recognized tort recovery for emotional and relational harms. In view of 
the fact that many jurisdictions recognize theories that redress direct injuries 
to economic and employment relationships, the absence of theories that 
redress direct injuries to family relationships, specifically marriage, is 
338. See, e.g., David Broder, Yoters Worried America is Backsliding, ADVOCATE (Baton 
Roogc) June 30, 1999, at 78. 
339. See supra Section lIL 
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conspicuous. J«> One can explain the difference by saying that family 
relationships are private matters involving affective aspects of life, and 
courts are not well suited to addressing such matters. It is not clear, 
however, why courts are incompetent to deal with such matters. Consider, 
for example, courts' recent forays into emotional injuries and employment 
issues. 
The refusal to provide ton redress for interference with the marital 
relationship may indicate several undesirable things about tort law in the 
United States. Professor Chamallas has noted that to cordon off emotional 
and relational harms from judicial competence is to maintain in ton law the 
disfavored status of injuries suffered to a greater extent by women. 341 As 
other commentators on tort law have observed, the abolition of the tons has 
left no means of redress at law when "grievous wrongs are suffered and 
some of life's most important interests ruthlessly invaded."l'l Leaving 
persons with devastating emotional injuries, without recourse at law, could 
lead to self help. At least, it leaves people with the belief that they were 
victims of wrong for which the law provides no redress. Finally, if ton law 
provides redress for interference with employment and business 
relationships but not a family relationship, what message does that send 
about the relative importance of family relationships in our society? If one 
rejects the incompetence of the court to address affective issues and the 
other reasons regarding the limitations of tort law given in the · past for 
abolition of criminal conversation and alienation of affections, such as 
nondeterrence and insoluble causation and blame issues, then one is left 
with the answer that family relations are not as important as employment 
and business relations. That very well may be true. 
It is also questionable whether palpable injuries to one of rhe most 
significant relationships in our society should be left to coverage under an 
occasional tort theory, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
For the employment relationship, the movement has been in the opposite 
direction-to recognize a direct tort theory for abusive discharges and 
interferences with the employment relationship. 34l If the relationship of 
marriage is important enough to be protected by tort law, should plaintiffs 
340. HARPER ET AL, supra note 8, at 499-500 (stating that although family �lations arc 
among the "most delicate and impor1ant in our society," they arc given little protection under 
tort Jaw). 
341. Chamallas, supra note 48, at 499. 
342. HARPER ET AL, supra note 8, at 535. 
343. Many states have recognized the tort theory of recovery for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy. Some stales have codified wron&ful discllluge actions. Su, e.g., 
MOITT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-915 (2001); lA. REV. STAT. A'IN. § 23:967 (West 
1998). 
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be made to try to fit their claims into occasional relational tort theories? 
They will seldom be able to convince a court that adultery is outrageous 
enough to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. If it were, 
then criminal conversation or alienation of affections would be 
recognized. 344 
In sum, it is a gaping and, for me, inexplicable hole in tort law coverage 
to fail to provide some theory of recovery for interference with marriage. 
B. Harm Suffered by Women to a Greater Extent 
I realize that feminists historically have supported abolition of criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections. I think the questions raised by 
some modem feminist writers about the position of the feminists regarding 
the heart balm tons demands an answer: Was it appropriate for feminists to 
support the abolition for the purpose of destroying stereotypes of women 
when the tort theories offered individual female plaintiffs who were injured 
a means of redress, and if it was, docs such a position remain appropriate 
now?)4s 
Women suffer more from adultery than men suffer. Professor Chamallas 
cites numerous writers for the proposition that men suffer A greater 
emotional injury from discovering that their spouses have engaged in 
adultery than do women; she describes the injury as a kind of emasculation 
and a wound to men's "manly pride.',)46 On the other hand, Professor 
Larson argues that women, as the "emotional workers," are more likely to 
suffer emotional injury than men )4l I do not wish to speculate whether 
men or women suffer a greater emotional injury upon learn\:!I of a spouse's 
adultery. The injury is great for both men and women. I do argue, 
however, that the collective injuries to women are greater for two reasons. 
First, the survey data regarding extramarital sexual activity suggest, and 
most people would guess, that married men engage in adultery more than 
married women )49 Second, if discovered adultery leads to divorce, as it 
344. Scamardo v. Dunaway, 694 So. 2d 1041, 1042 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Quinn v. Walsh, 
732 N.E.2d 330, 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). 
345. See Coombs, supra note 59, at 15-19; Larson, supra note 59, at 397-401. 
346. Chamallas, supra note 5, at 340-41. 
347. Larson, supra note 59, at 448-49. 
348. See SPIUNO, supra note 5. 
349. See Rasmusel\ supra note 237, at 2 n.1 (discussing "conventional wisdom" and a case 
study in a Virginia county). 
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often does,350 the collateral losses of women are likely to be greater than 
those of men; women bear the brunt of the economic and life opportunity 
costs. Although women have made some strides toward economic 
independence, it is still true that many married women are, to a large extent, 
economically dependent on their husbands. 351 Anti-heart balm reformers in 
the 1 930s argued for a view of marriage in which emotions, not economics, 
controlled decisions.352 It should not be a . stunning revelation to state that 
the view of the reformers which called for insulating marriage issues from 
the cold economic forces of the market was not realistic then and certainly 
is not today. 353 Money and economics matter in matters of the heart-both 
at the point of marriage and divorce. If a divorce occurs, quite often the 
woman will have more difficult financial circumstances, 354 and, if there are 
children, she may still have the principal child raising responsibilities. 
Moreover, both the disadvantaged financial circumstances and the family 
responsibilities are a result of the woman's investment in the marriage. 355 I 
do not suggest that a tort theory for interference with marriage would 
provide a remedy for all the economic injuries flowing from adultery and 
divorce. I do contend, however, that married women who divorce generally 
suffer economic loss as well as emotional harm. If women do suffer greater 
350. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994); Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 
554, 559 (N.C. App. 1999), review denied, 514 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1999), appeal dismissed, 542 
S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000) . 
351. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 59, at 427-28 ("Despite notable advances in recent 
decades by an elite group of American women, persistent economic dependency and tenacious 
sex roles continue to make connection to a man an important avenue to a stable and secure life 
for many women."); see also Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: 
Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 63-66 (1991) (discussing views of 
some that no-fault divorce has badly hurt women and children economically). 
352. Tushnet, supra note 98, at 2615. 
353. Id. 
354. Professor Perry analogizes a divorce to an accident in tort law and identifies primary, 
secondary, and tertiary costs of a divorce. Perry, supra note 351, at 66-70. The secondary 
costs, which she identifies as "economic costs to the individuals and to society include the 
economic costs to the spouse who has sacrificed or compromised her career in order to further 
the interests of her marriage." Id. at 68; see also Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning 
Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It Property, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 109 
(1996) (arguing that divorcing spouse's interest in the property of their spouse's enhanced 
earning power should be recognized) . In the Hutelmyer case, the court cited the plaintiff's 
evidence of loss of income, life insurance, and pension benefits as part of the evidence 
supporting the award of $500,000 in compensatory damages. Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d at 561. 
Professor Rasmusen notes that a spouse's threat to divorce upon discovering adultery will not 
be credible and thus will not deter adultery if the faithful spouse has made substantial 
investments in the marriage. The investments mean the faithful spouse has too much to lose. 
Rasmusen, supra note 23 7, at 2. 
3 55. See source cited supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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collateral loss from adultery, then not providing a tort remedy for 
interference with marriage will adversely affect women more thll!l men. 
Providing a theory of recovery for interference with marriage might not 
provide a substantial source of recovery for all or most plaintiffs. Some 
defendants would have the resources to satisfy a judgment, and some would 
not. This is no different from most other intentional tort theories. Many 
defendants in a battery claim will not be able to satisfy a judgment, unless 
they have an insurance policy that covers it. 356 The potential that some 
judgments will be unrecoverable, however, has not been seen as a reason to 
abolish the tort theory of battery. In the context of adultery, if divorce 
results, the unfaithful spouse may contribute to satisfaction of a judgment 
against the third party, and I do not see that as negative. 357 
C. Current Views in Society Favoring Reconsideration 
There is a public discourse about family values and morality and concern 
with moral decline in American society. There is also a movement to 
change the no-fault divorce regime. 318 Perhaps most importantly, feminist 
scholars and others have questioned both some of the results and some of 
the underlying arguments of the heart balm abolition movement. Feminists 
and others are re-examining the very real emotional and economic injuries 
suffered by women before, during, and after marriages and questioning 
whether current family and tort law provide adequate protection. Ln a 
society in which such views are being expressed, it is appropriate to 
reconsider the need for an interference with marriage tort. 
I realize that there is substantial opposition, wielding well-reasoned 
arguments, to recognition of such a tort. I know that the recognition of a 
modified tort, such as the one I propose in the next section, will create many 
problems. Nonetheless, in contemporary American society, with the issues 
being debated, the time has come to reconsider the marriage interference 
torts. 
356. See Smith v. St Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 622 F. Supp. 867, 867-77 (W.D. Aik. 1985) 
(holding that liability for alienation of affections was covered by insurance policy). 
357. I realize that some may read into this the old arguments against criminal conversation 
and alienation of affections on the ground that they are panicularly susceptible to blackmail or 
extortion. I do not think, however, that the incentives to settle such a suit are significantly 
different from the incentives in olher types of tort actions. 
358. See Jones, supra note 40, at 86-88 (citing this as a reason for reconsidering the torts). 
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VI. A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE 
WITII MARRIAGE TORT 
There are problems with alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation. Professor Dobbs' critique of interference torts raises a 
number of concerns. The one that troubles me the most is that the 
interference torts potentially impose liability for interference perpetrated by 
speech. 359 Applying that criticism to alienation of affections, parents or 
others might be sued for trying to persuade their child to leave an abusive 
spouse or companion. Although parents and others might avoid liability on 
the basis of privilege,360 the potential coverage of speech as interference is 
troubling. An angry spouse might sue a would-be suitor who uses speech to 
try to entice a married person. Although it could be argued that if the 
propositioned spouse does not leave his spouse or commit adultery, the 
plaintiff spouse would be unlikely to recover, the potential for trivial 
lawsuits and the potential infringement on speech are vexing. 
The concern with application of the torts to speech may be viewed as 
part of a larger criticism of the interference with business torts-that the tort 
does not proscribe specific conduct, but instead a state of mind. 361 
A concern I have with criminal conversation is that the tort does not 
require knowledge on the part of the interferer that the person is married. 
Writing about the interference with business tort, Professor Wonnell argued 
that the requirement of knowledge of the existence of the relationship is a 
crucial element of the tort to avoid overdeterrence. 362 I think the same is 
true of interference with marriage. Not requiring knowledge would impose 
too great a burden on the market for sexual relations. Moreover, the 
knowledge requirement ensures that the interferer has a high level of 
culpability or blameworthiness. Without the knowledge requirement, one 
could be liable for interference with marriage for having sexual relations 
with a married person who misrepresented his marital status. 
In light of the foregoing concerns and others and in recognition of the 
fact that most states abolished the existing torts , I would confine the 
revised tort to the specific conduct of adultery. Thus, the tort would borrow 
the wrongful act requirement from criminal conversation and the knowledge 
of the marriage requirement from alienation of affections. I do not think 
that proof of alienation of love and affection should be retained as an 
359. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 361-63. 
360. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 686. 
361.  Dobbs, supra note 24, at 347-50 
362. Wonnell, supra note 161 ,  at 143-45. 
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element of the tort. 363 That should be left to valuation of damages. Thus, 
the elements of the new intentional interference with marriage tort would be 
the existence of a valid marriage, defendant's knowledge of existence of 
marriage, and sexual relations between the defendant and the spouse. 
Consent of the nonparticipating spouse, a defense to criminal conversation, 
should be a recognized defense and should be understood to include 
marriages in which the spouses have agreed that exclusive sexual relations 
is not part of their marriage. 
This proposed tort is a narrow relational tort that certainly does not 
address all interferences with the marital relationship.364 It does, however, 
address the type of interference that most Americans say is morally wrong 
and the one that seems to provoke the greatest sense of outrage and injury in 
married persons. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Criminal conversation and alienation of affections have been under 
assault for sixty-five years, and there is not much left of them. The 
abolition of two old torts in a time of general expansion of tort liability is a 
remarkable occurrence, but few in the legal profession have remarked on it. 
Although the reasons usually given for abolition of these torts are 
unpersuasive, the demise can be understood in terms of changes in tort law, 
ideological movements, and changes in societal views and values. The 
Hutelmyer case brought the torts to the nation's attention briefly several 
years ago. Notwithstanding that brief notoriety (or perhaps because of it), it 
is likely that they will be abolished in the few states that continue to 
recognize them in the near future. 
I have argued that the case never was made effectively for the abolition 
of the torts. Further, I have argued that there are good reasons to recognize 
a revised tort theory that provides redress for intentional interference with 
the important relationship of marriage. If recognized, would that tort theory 
363. Jones, supra note 40, at 87 (noting problems with proof of existence of love and 
affection and suggesting that proof of adultery might be sufficient). 
364. Professor Chamallas posed the question whether I think the tort should be limited to 
marriages in which the couple has children. That is a narrowing of the tort that I do not favor, 
but I do think the arguments for the proposed tort are strongest in that context. The potential 
harmful effects of adultery on children is a justification for the intervention of tort law to protect 
the third-party interests. See supra notes 169, 255-56 and accompanying text. 
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pn.:vcnt adultery and save families? Of course it would-just like the tort 
l a w  of battery prevents people from hitting each other and saves bodies.365 
365. I will not close without making clear that my title exaggerates the effect that I believe 
the proposed tort would have. Nonetheless, complete deterrence has never been required by tort 
law to justify the existence of a tort. As I have suggested earlier, I think that tort law often 
recognizes theories of recovery as a reflection of society's values and for other reasons, even 
when the deterrent effect may be minimal. What conduct is deterred, for example , by the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress? 
